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FIRST AMENDMENT BASED COPYRIGHT MISUSE

DAVID S. OLSON*
ABSTRACT
We are at a crossroads with respect to the underdeveloped
equitable defense of copyright misuse. The defense may go the way of
its sibling, antitrust-based patent misuse, which seems to be in a
state of inevitable decline. Or—if judges accept the proposal of this
Article—courts could reinvigorate the copyright misuse defense to
better protect First Amendment speech that is guaranteed by statute,
but that is often chilled by copyright holders misusing their copyrights to control others’ speech.
The Copyright Act serves First Amendment interests by encouraging authors to create works. But copyright law can also discourage
the creation of new works by preventing subsequent creators from
using copyrighted work to make their own, new speech. Courts have
long recognized this inherent tension and have also recognized that
the conflict should sometimes be decided in favor of allowing a
subsequent speaker the right to make unauthorized use of others’
copyrighted works. Accordingly, courts created, and Congress codified, the fair use defense to copyright infringement, which allows
unauthorized use of copyrighted works under certain circumstances
that encourage speech and creation of transformative works. The
problem with fair use, however, is that the informational uncertainties and transaction costs of litigating the defense make the fair use
right unavailable to many as a practical matter. Subsequent creators
* Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. My research was made possible in
part by a research grant from the McHale Fund. I thank the following people for helpful
critiques and comments: Julie Ahrens, Michael Cassidy, Anthony Falzone, Sheila Findley,
Mark Lemley, Lawrence Lessig, David Levine, Joseph Liu, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lisa
Ramsey, Diane Ring, Pamela Samuelson, Robert Spoo, Alfred Yen, and the colloquium
participants at Boston College Law School, the University of Cincinnati Law School,
Villanova Law School, the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and the Works in
Progress Intellectual Property Conference. I am grateful for the research assistance of Juliet
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are left open to intimidation by copyright holders threatening infringement suits.
By decoupling the copyright misuse defense from its basis in
antitrust principles and basing it instead in First Amendment speech
principles, the legal protections for fair use can be shifted from
theoretical rights to practical rights for many. Copyright misuse has
two deterrent features that will allow fair use as a practical right.
First, a copyright holder’s misuse of its copyrights against anyone
can be used to prove the defense of misuse. Second, once misuse is
found, the copyright owner loses its ability to enforce its copyright
against everyone, at least until the misuse is cured. Thus, by defining
as copyright misuse the unjustified chilling of speech that some
copyright holders perpetrate, the misuse defense will encourage
important speech rights that are currently underprotected.
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INTRODUCTION
We are at a crossroads with respect to the underdeveloped
equitable defense of copyright misuse. The defense may go the way
of its sibling, antitrust-based patent misuse, which seems to be in
a state of inevitable decline. Or—if judges accept the proposal of this
Article—courts could reinvigorate the copyright misuse defense to
make it serve as a protector of statutorily guaranteed First Amendment speech.
The Copyright Act serves First Amendment interests by encouraging authors to create works. The Copyright Act grants authors
exclusive rights to their works, and thus, if they create works that
the public is willing to buy, they can profit from their creations. But
copyright law can also deter speech, and discourage the creation of
new works, by preventing subsequent creators from using copyrighted work to make their own, new speech.1 Courts have long
recognized this inherent tension and have also recognized that the
conflict should sometimes be decided in favor of allowing a subsequent use of another’s copyrighted work. For instance, there is a
strong First Amendment interest in allowing rival politicians to
quote their opponents’ speeches without permission when campaigning for office. Similarly strong First Amendment interests exist in
critique or commentary on books, articles, plays, music, visual art,
and other forms of expression, as well as in the quotations of
historical and literary figures in works analyzing such figures. Any
effective commentary, critique, or scholarship will generally need
to quote the works being analyzed. Courts recognized early on,
however, that if copyright owners could prohibit quotations from
their works by critics and commentators, only favorable commentators would ever be given permission to quote from copyrighted
works, and free speech would be curtailed.2
Courts created, and Congress later codified, the fair use defense
to copyright infringement because of this recognized value of the
speech interests involved in the unauthorized use of copyrighted
1. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1984) (noting the
unlikelihood of creators licensing critical reviews or lampoons).
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works.3 The statutory test for fair use sets out four factors in
analyzing whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is
socially valuable enough to overcome whatever harm it does to the
(mostly financial) interests of the copyright holder in preventing use
of his work.4 I believe that the fair use test does an admirable job of
setting out the factors a court should consider to determine whether
to allow an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work.
The problem with the fair use test, however, is that although it
looks great on paper, the informational uncertainties and transaction costs of litigating a fair use determination make the fair use
right unavailable to many as a practical matter. The fair use test
requires detailed consideration of the copyright and speech interests
at issue.5 The nuance and sensitivity of the test often make it
difficult for parties to know their legal rights without litigating.6
This level of uncertainty leaves those who would make probable fair
use of a copyrighted work vulnerable to threats of copyright infringement.7 The possibility of being assessed statutory damages
and attorney’s fees that may total many multiples above any actual
damages further deters people from making fair use of copyrighted
material.8 In the most egregious cases, copyright holders can deter
obvious fair use by threatening to sue the user of their copyrighted
works because the cost of defending a fair use suit is quite high.

3. See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use”
and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779, 799-800 (2005) (“[W]hile the
copyright doctrine of fair use was not codified by Congress until 1976, the doctrine existed
previously in common law.”); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
4. The four factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
5. Id.
6. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 292 (2004).
7. John A. Fonstad, Note, Protecting Fair Use with Fogerty: Toward a New Dual
Standard, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 623, 635 (2007).
8. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 443 (2009).
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This unfortunate situation is well known in copyright literature,9
and commentators have made numerous suggestions regarding
how to change copyright law or the fair use defense to alleviate this
problem.10 Suggested legislative changes have, for the most part,
fallen on deaf ears, however. This is not surprising given that
content owners have more organizational and lobbying power than
diverse persons who would like to make fair use of copyrighted
works.11 And although some of the suggested changes to judging
fair use cases may yet be adopted by courts,12 the chasm between
statutory and practical fair use rights remains wide.
Sophisticated copyright owners know this dilemma, and they are
able to misuse their copyrights—by threatening litigation without
a good-faith basis, or by tying demands for editorial control to
licenses to use their works—in order to make practically unavailable those fair use rights that are explicitly granted by law. A
solution—or at least a partial solution—is available, however. My
proposal would not require any changes to the substantive rights of
copyright holders or of fair users.13 Each person’s rights would be
exactly as they are set out by statute. Instead, my proposal would
increase the practical availability of the statutorily granted fair use
right.
9. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1096, 1099 (2007); J.
Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The
Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement,
83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 526-27 (2004) (“[T]he resulting penalty [for infringement] can become so
large that it becomes grossly excessive in relation to any legitimate interest in punishment
and deterrence.”). See generally Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping
Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1859-60 (2009); Samuelson & Wheatland,
supra note 8, at 443; R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public
Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 429 (2005).
10. See infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
11. See Fonstad, supra note 7, at 623.
12. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 40910 (2002).
13. Although many of the reforms that scholars have suggested to copyright law or fair
use have merit, see infra notes 129-46 and accompanying text, I believe that, generally,
section 107 of the Copyright Act does a fairly good job of balancing the interests of copyright
holders and users of copyrighted works. I think the frustration that drives many reform
proposals is that the time, expense, and uncertainty of the fair use defense make it easy for
copyright holders to threaten litigation to deter even obvious fair use. I believe my proposed
copyright misuse defense based in First Amendment principles would make fair use more
practically available, and thus lessen the need for reforms to copyright law or fair use.
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“Copyright misuse” currently exists as an underdeveloped equitable defense to copyright infringement. The problem is that the
defense developed as an analog to “patent misuse,” and, like patent
misuse, courts tend to focus primarily on antitrust issues in
determining whether the copyright misuse defense should apply.
This Article argues that copyright misuse should be decoupled from
its basis in antitrust principles and instead should be based
primarily in First Amendment speech principles. This would be
beneficial for two reasons. First, antitrust-based copyright misuse
may be inevitably on the decline due to a strong attack on the
misuse defense, both in patent and copyright cases, by critics who
argue that antitrust concerns are poorly addressed through the
misuse defense. Second, just as antitrust concerns can be addressed
directly by antitrust law, the chilling of legally protected First
Amendment speech by aggressive copyright holders can best be
curbed by a copyright misuse defense that focuses specifically on
free speech interests. In particular, First Amendment based copyright misuse would occur when a copyright holder uses its copyright
to (1) threaten litigation in the face of obvious fair use, (2) seek to
deter areas of inquiry through litigation threats, or (3) grant
licenses to quote from or use copyrighted works only if the user
grants the copyright holder improper editorial control.14
The copyright misuse defense might not seem to pack much
punch at first—after all, why would a copyright holder care if its
threats or licensing behavior are occasionally called unfair? But two
unique features of copyright misuse as it currently exists make it a
powerful defense. First, an accused infringer can defend on the basis
of copyright misuse by proving that the copyright owner misused its
copyright against anyone—not just against the defendant to the
suit. Thus, if a copyright owner used its copyrights to deter obvious
fair use by a third party unrelated to the suit being litigated, that
misuse as to the third party would nevertheless be grounds for a
misuse finding in the current litigation. This means that a copyright
14. Improper editorial control would not include a copyright owner controlling the content
produced by someone whom the copyright holder has engaged to work at his direction—such
as a screenwriter writing a screenplay from a book. Rather, to qualify as misuse the copyright
holder must be seeking to gain editorial control to prevent speech from being made that the
copyright owner does not like or to prevent discussion of some areas of inquiry.
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holder would have to behave properly towards all users of its
copyrights, not just toward whomever it chooses to sue. Second, the
remedy for copyright misuse is that courts refuse to enforce the
misuser’s copyrights against anyone. The misuser may eventually
cure the misuse and make its copyrights enforceable again, but in
the meantime it will not be allowed to enforce its copyrights against
even blatant infringers. For copyright owners making significant
income from their copyrights, this will serve as a significant incentive to avoid behavior even near the line of misuse.
Part I gives examples to show the severity of the problem and the
ways in which the current regime deters constitutionally protected
speech qualifying as fair use. Part II discusses the way that the
legal right to fair use is often not practically available. Specifically,
I consider the current dynamics of copyright law that allow
copyright holders to chill statutorily protected fair use of copyrighted material, but that leave would-be fair users with few tools
to deter overly aggressive copyright holders. Part III reviews
proposed reforms to better enable the actual use of statutorily
granted fair use rights. Part IV examines the evolution of copyright
misuse from its basis in antitrust-based patent law to the present.
Recently, a few courts have recognized that it is a defense that can
serve interests other than antitrust, including public policy interests
underlying copyright law. Part IV also discusses the critiques of an
antitrust-based misuse defense and why these strong critiques
make basing copyright misuse in antitrust unwise and uncertain.
Part V sets forth the argument for basing the defense of copyright
misuse prominently in First Amendment speech principles instead
of in antitrust principles. Part V also explores the implications of
shifting the basis for the copyright misuse defense to First Amendment principles and sets forth some examples of what copyright
misuse based firmly in the First Amendment will look like.
I. THE (MIS)USE OF COPYRIGHT TO CHILL SPEECH AND INQUIRY
The aggressive use of copyright, whether out of a desire to extract
maximum profits for copyrighted works, or out of a desire to control
others’ speech, often leads to the chilling of valuable speech that
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is protected by the fair use defense to copyright infringement.15
Instances of such aggressive use of copyright without regard for fair
use are legion,16 particularly when it comes to copyrights held by
authors’ estates. For example, the Estate of Martin Luther King,
Jr., has been criticized for demanding payments for the use of Dr.
King’s words from members of the news media and historians who
use excerpts from King’s speeches, many of which are plainly fair
use.17
Sometimes the King Estate seems to be simply threatening litigation so that it can be paid a licensing fee for use of its copyrights.
Of course, the Estate has a right to be paid for uses of its copyrighted works, but the Estate seems to seek fees indiscriminately
in cases of commercialization and of protected fair use alike. In
2000, the Estate settled four years of litigation against CBS. The
Estate had sought to enjoin CBS from using footage CBS had shot
of Dr. King’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech in a documentary.18
Although the settlement terms were confidential, the parties
reported that CBS would retain the right to use the footage in
exchange for a contribution of an undisclosed amount to the Martin
15. Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 673, 695 (2003).
16. See id. at 677-78. Estates may be more aggressive in all aspects of copyright
enforcement in part because the pressure on trustees of authors’ estates to maximize revenue
from the estates’ copyrights may be greater than the pressure on an author herself. An author
can agree that a use is fair, or that the use can be permitted pursuant to a royalty-free license,
without worrying that she will be criticized and perhaps held liable for not maximizing
revenue from her copyrights. A trustee of an author’s estate, however, has a fiduciary duty
to the estate and may have financially motivated beneficiaries of the estate looking over his
shoulder, second-guessing decisions to forgo revenue that might have been available through
use of aggressive techniques with regard to copyrighted works. For excellent discussions of
how authors’ estates continue to exercise control over copyrighted works after an author dies,
see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD
144-46 (2010); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy
and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 315-27 (2006); Justin Hughes, Fair Use
Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 794 (2003).
17. Robbie Brown, King Estate Considering Suit over Unlicensed Obama Items, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at A9 (“In recent years, the King family has come under criticism from
... scholars who believe that the family is being overprotective of Dr. King’s legacy, in
particular for suing news organizations and historians who use excerpts from his speeches
without paying the family.”).
18. King Estate Settles Lawsuit Against CBS Over Rights To ‘I Have A Dream’ Speech,
JET, July 31, 2000, at 34, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_8_98/ai_
63974332/?tag=content;col1.
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Luther King, Jr., Center for Nonviolent Social Change in Atlanta.19
Just after Barack Obama’s election as President in 2008, the King
Estate said that it was considering suing unauthorized sellers of
merchandise showing King and Obama with slogans like “The
Dream Is Reality.”20 These are particularly aggressive moves given
that short phrases like “I have a dream” are not covered by copyright law,21 and that the copyrights in photographs taken by news
reporters and others not working for the subject of the photographs
are held by the photographers.22
Other authors’ estates have proved equally controlling of
copyrights in a manner that is likely to discourage fair use. The
Gershwin Estate is reportedly extremely aggressive in seeking to
maximize revenues from its copyrights while strictly controlling
how its copyrighted work may be used.23 The Estate of T.S. Eliot is
controlled by the author’s widow, Valerie Eliot, who is famously
controlling of Eliot’s work so as to guard his reputation.24 Scholars
are reportedly tremulous in seeking permissions from Mrs. Eliot.25
Likewise, the Estate of Samuel Beckett is controlled by the author’s
nephew, Edward Beckett, who will not allow uses of the author’s
19. Id. at 34-35.
20. Brown, supra note 17, at A9 (“Isaac Newton Farris Jr., a nephew of Dr. King and
president of the King Center in Atlanta, said the family was considering several options,
including lawsuits against sellers of unauthorized merchandise linking Mr. Obama and Dr.
King under slogans like ‘The Dream Is Reality.’ ‘It’s not about the money,’ Mr. Farris said....
But he added, ‘We do feel that if somebody’s out there making a dollar, we should make a
dime.’”).
21. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2009) (barring the copyrighting of “[w]ords and short phrases
such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typographic
ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents”).
22. See Jeffrey D. Powell, Note, Printers’ Claims to Lithographic Film Ownership: You
Can’t Always Get What You Want, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 791 (1984) (noting that under
copyright law, a copyright belongs to the photographer unless the work was commissioned by
the subject of the photograph).
23. See Arewa, supra note 16, at 315-27.
24. See Karen Christensen, Dear Mrs. Eliot ..., GUARDIAN, Jan. 29, 2005, at 4; see also
Rebecca F. Ganz, Note, A Portrait of the Artist’s Estate as a Copyright Problem, 41 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 739, 752 (2008) (pointing out the “powerful position given to heirs and estates in our
present system” (citing Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1118 (1990) (“A historian who wishes to quote personal papers of deceased public figures now
must satisfy heirs and executors for ... years after the subject’s death. When writers ask
permission, the answer will be, ‘Show me what you write. Then we’ll talk about permission.’
If the manuscript does not exude pure admiration, permission will be denied.”))).
25. Christensen, supra note 24, at 4.
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work that he says the author would not have wanted.26 In the end,
the power over copyright given to authors and their estates is all too
often abused to censor and control the next generation of scholars
and authors in ways that, in practice, overstep the statutorily
delineated bounds between protection for creation—the copyright
grant—and protection of new speech—the statutorily allowed fair
uses without copyright holder permission.27
A prime example of persistent copyright misuse is the Estate of
James Joyce’s history of aggressive use of copyright claims to stifle
the speech of others. The remainder of Part I provides a detailed
summary of how the Joyce Estate misused copyright in an attempt
to squelch scholarly speech and how the defense of copyright misuse
eventually helped protect such speech. This case study will provide
an excellent opportunity to identify the weakness in our current
copyright regime and explore a plausible solution: a defense of
copyright misuse based on First Amendment policies.
The Joyce Estate controls the copyrights in author James Joyce’s
works; the Estate today is controlled by Joyce’s grandson, Stephen
James Joyce, who is well known for his contempt for Joyce
scholars.28 Since he gained control of the Estate, the Estate has
engaged in aggressive use of its copyrights to try to curtail speech
about topics—literary or personal—it does not like.29 The Estate has
done so by refusing to grant anyone permission to quote from
Joyce’s work in a way Stephen Joyce dislikes, or to discuss topics
about Joyce and the Joyce family that Stephen Joyce dislikes.30 If
refusing to grant copyright permission is not enough to get his way,
Stephen Joyce has not been hesitant to use litigation and especially
the threat of litigation, even in clear cases of fair use.31
26. Mel Gussow, A Reading Upsets Beckett’s Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994, at A11.
27. For a discussion of the problem, see Ganz, supra note 24, at 761 (“Although certain
estates will elect to do the right thing in allowing or even enabling creative uses of
copyrighted works, without a legally enforceable system, many famous estates will continue
to abuse their power and censor the work of another generation of artists and scholars.”).
28. See D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector, NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 34, 36
(“Academics, [Stephen Joyce] declared, were like ‘rats and lice—they should be exterminated!’”), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/06/19/060619fa_fact?current
Page=all.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 35-38.
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Numerous examples exist of the Joyce Estate’s desire to control
the content of Joyce scholars’ work via threatening and litigious
behavior.32 For example, Stephen Joyce objected to an epilogue in
Brenda Maddox’s biography of James Joyce’s wife, Nora, because
the biography discussed the time Joyce’s daughter, Lucia, spent in
a mental institution.33 Stephen Joyce took the position that all
quotations from Joyce’s work that Maddox used in her book needed
to be licensed, and he threatened to withhold permission and to sue
if Maddox used the quotations without removing the material about
Lucia Joyce.34 Maddox responded by removing the section even
though copies of the book had already been printed.35
Although Stephen Joyce’s position was aggressive, it is true that
Great Britain, where Maddox lives and where her work was being
published, does not have the more extensive fair use protections
available to users of copyrighted works in the United States.36 So,
in Britain, Stephen Joyce may have been within his legal rights to
tie granting permission to quote from Joyce’s works to the requirement that Maddox not discuss Lucia Joyce. Contrary to Joyce’s
rights in Britain, scholars in the United States have fair use rights
to use quotes from the people and texts they are analyzing.37 The
use cannot be excessive, and authors cannot take more than is
needed for their purpose, but they certainly have the right to use
quotations from works liberally as required, assuming the fair use

32. See Peter Carty, Never on a Bloomsday, INDEPENDENT (UK), Jan. 12, 2000; Max, supra
note 28, at 35-38; see also Tim Cavanaugh, Op-Ed, Portrait of the Old Man as a Copyright
Miser, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-cavanaugh5jun
05,0,2402066.story.
33. Max, supra note 28, at 35.
34. Declaration of Carol Loeb Shloss in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’
Motion To Dismiss at ¶ 65, Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. C
06-3718 JW).
35. Max, supra note 28, at 35.
36. See Susanna Monseau, “Fit for Purpose”: Why the European Union Should Not Extend
the Term of Related Rights Protection in Europe, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 629, 643 (2009).
37. Jennifer Leman, Note, The Future of Unpublished Works in Copyright Law After the
Fair Use Amendment, 18 J. CORP. L. 619, 620 (1993) (“When an infringement suit is brought,
a fair use defense may be raised by the alleged infringer. This affirmative defense allows a
defendant to avoid liability for copying the copyrighted work, so long as it is used for ‘purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ..., scholarship, or research.’”).
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factors are met.38 Maddox’s quotations therefore would likely have
been fair use in the United States. The Joyce Estate’s interaction
with Maddox illustrates another behavior that is currently allowed
by law, but that Part V will suggest should be copyright misuse—
granting permission to quote from one’s copyrighted works with the
condition that the person quoting the work write as the copyright
holder dictates. This plainly discourages free speech and inquiry,
and the Joyce Estate’s behavior towards Maddox shows that
copyright holders will feel free to use their copyrights to discourage
such speech unless the holders are forbidden to do so.
In another example, the Joyce Estate stopped an Irish composer
from using a mere eighteen words from Finnegans Wake in a choral
piece by claiming that copyright permission was needed to use the
words and then withholding such permission.39 Stephen Joyce
apparently refused permission because he did not like the music.40
Using eighteen words to make a transformative choral piece plainly
qualifies as fair use in the United States.
Most pertinent to the inquiry of this Article is the case of Shloss
v. Sweeney.41 In 2006, Professor Carol Loeb Shloss sued the Estate
of James Joyce for a declaratory judgment that she had the right
under 17 U.S.C. § 107, covering fair use, to put quotations from
James Joyce’s work on her website. Her use of the quotations was
in support of the theses of her book about Joyce’s daughter titled
Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the Wake.42 The Joyce Estate settled
favorably to her nine months later. Although Professor Shloss’s fair
use arguments were strong, it is likely that the Estate settled so
quickly because of another count in Shloss’s complaint—her count
accusing the Estate of copyright misuse.43

38. Id.
39. Medb Ruane, The War of Words Over Joyce’s Literary Legacy, IRISH TIMES, June 6,
2000.
40. Id.
41. 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007). I served as counsel for Professor Shloss in this
litigation, so I want to emphasize that the views expressed here are mine alone.
42. CAROL LOEB SHLOSS, LUCIA JOYCE: TO DANCE IN THE WAKE (2003).
43. No doubt the availability of pro bono counsel also helped Professor Shloss turn the
tables in her favor. But as will be seen, even with all of the advantages she had, the Joyce
Estate still fought hard to stop her speech. See infra notes 78-87, 118.
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Carol Shloss, a professor of English at Stanford University,44
began researching a book on James Joyce’s daughter, Lucia, in
1988.45 Lucia Joyce was reportedly a troubled young woman, and
she was treated by a number of doctors in her twenties, including
psychiatrist Carl Jung.46 In 1932, at the age of 25, Lucia was
committed to a mental hospital by her brother, Giorgio.47 She was
confined to mental hospitals most of her life and died in one in
1982.48 To research Lucia Joyce, Shloss traveled the world searching
for documents about Lucia’s life.49 Many documents about Lucia
Joyce have been destroyed over the years, apparently by her family,
out of shame regarding her condition.50 Shloss also sought evidence
for her thesis that Lucia influenced and indirectly contributed to
Finnegans Wake.51
Stephen Joyce seems to have always considered his Aunt Lucia
off-limits for scholarly inquiry. In 1988, Stephen Joyce destroyed
many of Lucia’s letters.52 When scholars were outraged by his
actions, he responded, “What are people going to do to stop me?”53
Similarly, in 1992, Stephen Joyce succeeded in removing documents
regarding Lucia from the archives at the National Library of
Ireland, even though he had no legal claim to these papers.54
In addition to destroying documents, once it learned of Shloss’s
work, the Joyce Estate attempted to stymie Shloss’s investigation into Lucia’s life. For instance, when Shloss traveled to the
University of Buffalo in New York to consult the James Joyce
papers in the Special Collections at the Lockwood Memorial

44. William S. Kowinski, A Promising Artist Waylaid by Crashing of Her Mind, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 21, 2003, at M3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/
2003/12/21/RVGT73N8OC1.DTL.
45. Max, supra note 28, at 40.
46. See Hermione Lee, No She Said No, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2003, at A8.
47. See Sean O’Hagan, Private Dancer, OBSERVER, May 16, 2004, at 16 (book review),
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2004/may/16/biography.features.
48. See Kowinski, supra note 44, at M3.
49. See Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
50. See Kowinski, supra note 44, at M3.
51. See Max, supra note 28, at 40.
52. Id. at 34-35.
53. Janna Malamud Smith, Where Does a Writer’s Family Draw the Line?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1989, at BR1.
54. Max, supra note 28, at 35.
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Library,55 the library’s director told her that he had been contacted
by “intermediaries” from the Joyce Estate, who discouraged him
from giving Shloss access to the library’s Joyce materials.56 Shloss
was allowed to see the documents, but told to keep as “low-profile as
possible.”57 The director allegedly was afraid that the Joyce Estate
would sue the university if it found out that Shloss had used the
library’s Joyce materials.58 Although the university could not
actually have been sued for giving a patron access to library
materials, it does need copyright permission from the Joyce Estate
any time it wants to make use of Joyce’s work in exhibitions or
publications. Accordingly, the library director was reasonable in
fearing that angering the Joyce Estate could negatively impact the
library’s work.
Stephen Joyce also wrote a number of letters to Shloss directly
warning her not to use documents from any Joyce family members.
In a March 31, 1996, letter, Joyce told Shloss, “You do not have our
approval/permission to ‘use’ any letters or papers by or from Lucia
... [or] our authorization to use any letters from my grandfather to
anybody which deal with her.”59
Shloss pressed on notwithstanding Joyce’s threatening letters,
and, in 2001, she signed a contract with the publishing house
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux to publish her book.60 When Stephen
Joyce learned of the contract, he wrote Shloss and again warned her
against the use of any Joyce family materials.61 In this letter he
referred to the Estate’s history of litigation against other authors,
saying, “We have proven that we are willing to take any necessary
action to back and enforce what we legitimately believe in.”62
Although copyright law does not protect privacy rights,63 Joyce
55. Declaration of Carol Loeb Shloss in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’
Motion To Dismiss at ¶ 17, Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. C
06-3718 JW).
56. Max, supra note 28, at 41.
57. Declaration of Carol Loeb Shloss in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion To Dismiss at ¶ 17, Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No. C 06-3718 JW).
58. Id.
59. Id. at ¶ 17, Ex. C (emphasis added).
60. Id. at ¶ 25.
61. Max, supra note 28, at 41.
62. Id. at 35.
63. See MADOFF, supra note 16, at 121, 125 (noting that “copyright law ... provides

552

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:537

justified his aggressive position by saying that he needed to
“safeguard whatever remains of the much abused and invaded Joyce
family privacy.”64
Stephen Joyce also threatened Shloss’s publisher directly. In a
series of letters and phone calls, Joyce stated that he would not
allow any use of Lucia-related material, that Shloss needed his
permission to quote from letters written by Joyce family members
or associates, which was explicitly denied, and that he had “never
lost a lawsuit.”65 Shloss’s publisher supported its author and took
the position that Shloss’s use of the Lucia-related material was
protected by the statutory right to fair use of copyrighted material,
and thus permission from the Joyce Estate was not legally
required.66 This elicited further threats from Stephen Joyce in yet
more letters. He told Shloss’s publisher to “take ... very seriously”
his earlier letters and repeatedly warned against use of any of the
Lucia-related materials.67 He further warned Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux that it “should be aware of the fact that over the past decade
the James Joyce Estate’s ‘record’, in legal terms, is crystal clear and
we have proven on a number of occasions that we are prepared to
put our money where our mouth is.”68 When the publisher stopped
responding to his letters, Joyce wrote again to say that “[a]s I
indicated in my previous letter[,] there are more ways than one to
skin a cat!”69
Joyce did not stop there. A few months later he wrote again to
Shloss’s publisher to “formally inform” it that “Shloss and her publishers are NOT granted permission to use any quotation[s] from
anything” that Lucia Joyce “ever wrote, drew or painted.”70 He
protections for a person’s creative expressions” while “privacy law ... protects against feelings
of embarrassment”).
64. Declaration of Carol Loeb Shloss in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion To Dismiss at ¶ 26, Ex. G, Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No. C 06-3718 JW).
65. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30, Ex. H; Declaration of Jonathan Galssi in Support of Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss at ¶ 2, Ex. 2, Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No.
C 06-3718 JW).
66. Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
67. Declaration of Leon Friedman in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’
Motion To Dismiss at ¶ 2, Ex. 2, Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No. C 06-3718 JW).
68. Id.
69. Id. at ¶ 2, Ex. 3.
70. Id. at 92, Ex. 5.
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further stated that, according to him, “fair use does not apply to
letters[,] consequently no extracts from letters of any member of the
Joyce family can be used in Ms. Shloss’ book and I, acting for both
the Estate and Family, refuse to grant such permission.”71 Joyce
also included an open threat: “So be it. I am perfectly willing to play
the ‘game’ your way but there will be repercussions. This is not a
threat but a statement of fact.”72
Shloss had strong fair use arguments for her scholarly use of
quotations from books and letters for her Lucia Joyce book. Stephen
Joyce’s assertion, for example, that fair use does not apply to letters
was obviously false.73 But she quite reasonably feared that if she
used the materials to which she believed she had a right, she could
be bankrupted by even a meritless lawsuit. She told her agent in
2003, “It’s not a matter of winning or not. The suit itself would ruin
us.”74 Nor did Shloss’s publisher want to face a lawsuit, especially
given that profit margins on nonfiction books such as Shloss’s could
be easily consumed in the cost of a lawsuit, whether won or lost.75
Thus, in the end a significant amount of Lucia-related material
was cut from Shloss’s manuscript.76 Shloss was greatly dismayed
and felt that the book she had spent over a dozen years writing was
being gutted of important material. When her book was reviewed,
reviewers criticized her for a lack of evidentiary support for
otherwise interesting theses.77
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar
a finding of fair use.”).
74. Declaration of Carol Loeb Shloss in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion To Dismiss at ¶ 44, Ex. K, Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No. C 06-3718 JW).
75. Because the typical publisher expects to sell 5,000 copies, the expected profits per book
are well below the costs of defending a copyright lawsuit, which can be hundreds of thousands
of dollars. See David W. Kirkpatrick, Book Recommendations from Schoolreformers.com, 2 VT.
EDUC. REP. 46 (2002), http://www.schoolreport.com/vbe/nlet/11_18_02.htm; Motoko Rich, Math
of Publishing Meets the E-Book, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at B1 (stating that as many as 70
percent of books published make little or no money for the publisher and that publishers make
an average gross revenue of $4.05 on a $26 book, out of which they must pay overhead costs
such as editors, cover art designers, office space, and utilities, leaving small net profits per
book).
76. See Max, supra note 28, at 42.
77. See id.; see also Declaration of Carol Loeb Shloss in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss at ¶¶ 47-48, Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No. C 06-3718
JW).

554

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:537

Shloss was dissatisfied with the form in which her work was
published, and she eventually found pro bono counsel.78 She then
created a website on which was posted the excised material from her
book.79 She sent the Joyce Estate the material that she planned to
host on her website and again asked it to agree that her use was fair
and protected under copyright law.80 Again the Estate refused to
agree and threatened to sue under its copyrights.81 The Estate said
that Shloss’s proposed use of the Lucia-related materials was an
“unwarranted infringement of the Estate’s copyright.”82 The Estate
went on to “request in the strongest possible terms that [the
Estate’s] legal rights on this issue be respected.”83
Shloss filed a declaratory judgment action against the Joyce
Estate asking a court to rule that she had the fair use right to use
the material on her website. After the case survived a motion to
dismiss,84 the Joyce Estate settled with Shloss on terms that
allowed her to use the materials at issue.85 The Joyce Estate was
also ordered to pay Shloss’s attorney’s fees because she was the
prevailing party in the lawsuit.86 Shloss’s fees ran into the hundreds
of thousands of dollars.87 Even though she was eventually able to
win a judgment requiring the Joyce Estate to pay her fees, if she
had not had pro bono counsel, she never would have been able to

78. Shloss contacted Larry Lessig at Stanford Law School. After reviewing her situation,
Lessig agreed that he and his Center for Internet and Society would represent Shloss. I served
as the attorney with primary day-to-day responsibility for the case. Soon thereafter, Robert
Spoo joined the case, first with the law firm of Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, LLP
and then with Howard Rice. Mark Lemley and his former firm, Keker & Van Nest, LLP also
joined the team shortly after the complaint was filed.
79. Carol Loeb Shloss, LUCIA JOYCE: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL, http://www.lucia-theauthors-cut.info/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
80. See Max, supra note 28, at 42.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. Declaration of Grace Smith at Ex. 5, Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (No. C 06-3718 JW) (emphasis added).
84. Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
85. Bob Egelko, Professor Wins Fees from Joyce Estate, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29, 2009, at C1,
available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-29/bay-area/17204989_1_james-joyce-stephenjoyce-copyright-law.
86. Id.; Cavanaugh, supra note 32.
87. See Egelko, supra note 85 (noting that Shloss was awarded $329,000 in legal fees and
costs).
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front the costs of the fair use litigation on her own, and her fair use
rights would have been effectively foreclosed.
II. THE FAILURE OF FAIR USE AS A PRACTICALLY AVAILABLE RIGHT
Professor Shloss’s story perfectly illustrates the damage that can
be caused by what Alfred Yen calls “aggressive copyright claims.”88
These claims are often made against authors producing highly
transformative or critical works and essentially assert that copying
any language constitutes infringement.89 Such overzealous assertion
of copyrights in cases involving criticism or transformative work
ultimately harms society because it results in the silencing of new
“original” expression.90
Authors faced with aggressive copyright claims are left few
options to defend themselves.91 The two main defenses available are
88. Yen, supra note 15, at 677 (“The practice of ignoring the First Amendment in
copyright cases has ... made possible the problematic assertion of what I call ‘aggressive
copyright claims.’ As the label implies, these claims aggressively test the boundaries of
copyright by urging courts to adopt unconventional or novel readings of doctrine that would
extend copyright well beyond its core of preventing individuals from reproducing the
copyrighted works of others.”).
89. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1052 (2006) (“When de
minimis copying and fair use are routinely discouraged, a copyright notice comes to signal not
merely that the work is protected, but that every reproduction is prohibited.”); Yen, supra
note 15, at 677 (“[A]ggressive copyright claims are often made against defendants who have
done more than simply ‘parrot’ a copyrighted work. These defendants have generally added
meaningful work of their own, whether in the form of comment and criticism, significant
reworking of the plaintiff’s material, or new material unrelated to the copyrighted work. At
their most extreme, aggressive copyright claims assert that almost any borrowing from a
copyrighted work constitutes actionable infringement.”).
90. See, e.g., JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse To Protect
Digital Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 85 (2004) (“These cases clearly also raise
important First Amendment issues, as copyright is wielded as a sword rather than as a shield,
to silence speakers who are engaged in criticism rather than in economic piracy.”); Mazzone,
supra note 89, at 1030 (“In addition to enriching publishers who assert false copyright claims
at the expense of legitimate users, copyfraud stifles valid forms of reproduction and creativity
and undermines free speech.”); Yen, supra note 15, at 682 (“Enforcing copyright against those
who add expression of their own to borrowed material means silencing newly created speech.
These losses are much more serious than losses of borrowed speech because no equivalent
existing speech takes the place of silenced new speech.”).
91. See Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Protecting the Public Policy Rationale of Copyright:
Reconsidering Copyright Misuse, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 565, 567-68 (2006) (“While the
copyright statute offers users some defenses for those accused of infringement—namely the
Fair Use Doctrine—the statute provides no definition of a copyright holder who abuses his
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fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy.92 The fair use defense
is defined by statute and allows for the unapproved use of copyrighted material in limited situations.93 The idea/expression
dichotomy protects the concept that a copyright does not grant an
author exclusive rights to an idea but instead merely to the
particular expression that he or she created.94 These two doctrines
together are sometimes thought to provide all necessary protections
against copyright holders infringing on the First Amendment rights
of authors.95
In reality, however, these defenses are not sufficient to protect
authors from aggressive copyright claims.96 In cases such as Carol
Shloss’s, the protection of a fair user’s rights is often prohibitively
expensive and insufficiently guaranteed under these two defenses
because asserting them requires an infringement trial.97 Furthermore, these defenses have vague boundaries and rely on multipart
judicial tests that make determining the likelihood of success
difficult.98 Unfortunately, this means that oftentimes authors are

rights and offers no restitution for a wrongly accused infringer.”) (footnote omitted).
92. Harris, supra note 90, at 93 (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that free speech interests
are adequately protected through the two major copyright-limiting doctrines: the idea/
expression dichotomy and fair use.”).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
94. Harris, supra note 90, at 88 (“[T]he idea/expression dichotomy ... holds that copyright
in expressive matter does not protect underlying ideas or facts contained in a copyrighted
work of authorship.”).
95. See Yen, supra note 15, at 676 (“According to conventional wisdom, copyright law
already incorporates First Amendment values through the idea/expression dichotomy and the
defense of fair use.”). See generally David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright
Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1393 (2009) (arguing that the two doctrines are insufficient
for the protection of First Amendment rights in light of the expansion of the scope of
copyright).
96. See Harris, supra note 90, at 108 (“Thus, while the scope of statutory copyright
protection has expanded, fair use has remained at best fixed, leaving it particularly ill-suited
to deal with technological change.”).
97. Id. at 98 (“As an affirmative defense, whether a use is ‘fair’ can be determined only
within the context of infringement litigation, and the defendant bears the burden of proof.
Thus ... users with limited resources may be silenced by the mere threat of litigation long
before a fair use analysis is brought to bear on any First Amendment interests.”) (footnote
omitted).
98. Yen, supra note 15, at 679 (“Doctrinal limits on the reach of copyright exist, but those
limits are frustratingly vague.”).
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effectively silenced by the threat of litigation, regardless of the
validity of the accuser’s claims.99
The Supreme Court recently affirmed that copyright law is
subject to First Amendment limitations.100 Indeed, the very purpose
of the Copyright Act is to foster First Amendment values.101 As the
Shloss v. Sweeney case makes plain, ironically, certain types of work
that the Copyright Act is designed to foster cannot be created—or
cannot be created well—without the right to quote the copyrighted
works of others. A classic example is a book review. The review
cannot be as compelling or complete without the use of quotations
from the work being reviewed. A paraphrase is simply not as convincing as a quotation. And, of course, if the book review is critical,
then the author of the reviewed work likely will not be willing to
give permission for the use of any quotations from the work.102
Likewise, documentaries, if they are to accurately reflect the world
they are filming, will often contain bits and pieces of other people’s
copyrighted works.103 Again, critical analysis of a work cannot be
99. See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 91, at 566 (“[T]he Chilling Effects study legitimizes the
concern about the ever-growing population of ... content owners who create a chilling effect
on the reuse of their work in the marketplace.”); Harris, supra note 90, at 98.
100. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (rejecting the argument that “copyrights
[are] ‘categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment’” (quoting Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
101. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546, 558 (1984) (observing that “the Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression,” and thus “[t]he monopoly created
by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public” (quoting Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984))) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant ... copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”).
102. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (suggesting that
authors are unlikely to license critical reviews).
103. See LESSIG, supra note 6, at 95-98. Lessig describes the experience of Jon Else while
filming his documentary about stage hands working on a production of Wagner’s Ring Cycle.
A scene in Else’s movie from backstage contained an indirect 4.5 second-long shot of The
Simpsons television show in the background. Fox demanded a $10,000 royalty for use of the
clip in the movie. Else was forced to remove the clip digitally, detracting from the “flavor of
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done without liberal quotation from the work. In addition, artistic
works that comment on other works or incorporate images, words,
or expression from popular culture must make use of copyrighted
works,104 especially given the current length of the copyright term.105
It is for these reasons that courts first recognized an equitable
right to fair use,106 which was later codified by Congress.107 Fair use
gives content creators the right to use the copyrighted work of
others “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research.”108 If a content creator wants to use a copyrighted work
for one of the purposes allowed by 17 U.S.C. § 107, then the content
creator can do so without asking permission or even informing the
copyright owner of the use. This all sounds well and good for the
efficient allowance of socially desirable uses of copyrighted works,
but the devil is in the details. As has been extensively discussed in
the literature, the four-part test set out in § 107 is famously

what was special about the scene.” Id.
104. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that artistic expression is deserving of
substantial First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 790 (1989) (“Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato’s discourse
in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known [music’s]
capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored musical
compositions to serve the needs of the state.... The Constitution prohibits any like attempts
in our own legal order. Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under
the First Amendment.”); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)
(“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures,
programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and
dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee.”); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S.
115, 119-20 (1973) (“[P]ictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings ... have First
Amendment protection.”).
105. See Peter B. Hirtle, Cornell Copyright Information Center, Copyright Term and the
Public Domain in the United States (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.copyright.cornell.edu/
resources/docs/copyrightterm.pdf.
106. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550; Sony, 464 U.S.
at 433; Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
108. Id.
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murky,109 and subsequent case law has not helped greatly to clarify
the question.110
This puts would-be fair users in an untenable situation. The only
way for them to be sure that their use of copyrighted material is fair
is to get a court judgment. The content creator may get a court
ruling either by suing for a declaratory judgment, if she has the
requisite actual conflict sufficient to meet the declaratory judgment
standard,111 or by using the copyrighted work, getting sued, and
having the court determine fair use at that time. Both of these
options have obvious drawbacks. In the second case, if the use of
every quotation from the copyrighted work is not deemed to be fair,
then the user may be liable for copyright damages, and perhaps
attorney’s fees.112 Although a user who meets the requirements for
bringing a declaratory judgment action may do so and avoid the
possibility of damages, the action itself is likely to be quite expensive. It can be made even more so if the copyright holder contests
that the jurisdictional requirement for a declaratory judgment
109. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 6, at 187 (“[F]air use in America simply means the right
to hire a lawyer.”); Dana Beldiman, Fundamental Rights, Author’s Right, and
Copyright—Commonalities or Divergences?, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 39, 58 (2005) (“Because
of the vagueness and subjectivity of the fair use test, neither the creators themselves nor their
legal advisors are in a position to predict whether a given use is fair.”); Matthew D. Bunker,
Transforming the News: Copyright and Fair Use in News-Related Contexts, 52 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S. 309, 326-27 (2005) (“[I]t seems fair to say that fair use jurisprudence in the news
context is something of a conceptual muddle .... This state of affairs is unfortunate, of course,
because of the tremendous uncertainty faced by putative fair users.”); Andrew Inesi, Images
of Public Places: Extending the Copyright Exemption for Pictorial Representations of
Architectural Works to Other Copyrighted Works, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 61, 76 (2005) (“The
fact-intensive nature of the fair use analysis, combined with considerable argument and
confusion over how the test should be applied, makes it difficult to predict the applicability
of fair use in all but the most obvious cases.”).
110. See, e.g., Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[T]he issue
of fair use ... is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.”); Marvin Worth Prods.
v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“[T]he defendants’ major
position is anchored on the theory of fair use. This doctrine ... judges and commentators alike
have found to be exceptionally elusive even for the law.”); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.,
293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“The doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible
as virtually to defy definition.”).
111. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 195 (3d
Cir. 2003); Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998); Clean Flicks of
Colo., L.L.C. v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1243 (D. Colo. 2006); Online Policy Group
v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
112. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504-05 (2006).
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action has been met, as did the Joyce Estate in Shloss v. Sweeney.113
The user of the copyrighted work will have to hire attorneys, file a
complaint, withstand any jurisdictional challenge, deal with any
discovery the court allows, and then file papers parsing each use of
a copyrighted work and the reasons the use qualifies as fair. Such
cases can easily reach six figures in attorney’s fees on each side.114
When one adds the potential assessment of statutory damages to
the amount expended on legal fees, the deterrent effect on would-be
fair users becomes even more substantial. Statutory damages range
from $750 to $30,000 per work infringed and can be increased to
$150,000 per work infringed if a court finds that the defendant’s
infringement was willful.115 This means that even if the market
effect on the copyright owner’s work is zero, anyone adjudged to
have infringed the work may still be assessed thousands of dollars
of penalties per work infringed.116
As a result, aggressive copyright holders can hold the threat of
litigation over the heads of potential users to get them to desist from
using copyrighted material or to make them use it only in ways
acceptable to the copyright holder. While it is true that actually
litigating a fair use dispute is costly for both sides, it is nearly
costless for the copyright holder to threaten suit or simply to leave
the potential user in fear of suit. This tactic was precisely the one
113. Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss at 16-18, Shloss v.
Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. C 06-3718 JW).
114. See, e.g., Kevin M. Lemley, I’ll Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: A Proposed Model
for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 AKRON L. REV. 287, 311
(2004) (“Intellectual property litigation typically spans several years with total costs
commonly exceeding hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. A 2001 survey ...
calculated the average cost through trial of typical patent disputes ... at $1,499,000; $699,000
for similar trade secret disputes; $502,000 for trademark disputes; and $400,000 for copyright
disputes.”) (footnote omitted).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2).
116. See, e.g., Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008)
(ordering new trial in peer-to-peer file sharing case after jury found defendant liable for
statutory damages in the amount of $9,250 per each act of infringement without a showing
of actual distribution of infringing works); Special Verdict Form at 17-20, Capitol Records Inc.
v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010) (No. 06-CV-1497) (finding defendant
who shared music files using peer-to-peer software liable for willful copyright infringement
and awarding $80,000 per song); Jury Verdict Form at 2-8, Sony BMG Music Entm’t v.
Tenenbaum, 672 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D. Mass. 2009) (Nos. 03-CV-11661-NG, 07-CV-11446-NG)
(finding defendant liable for $22,500 per act of willful infringement for sharing music files
using peer-to-peer technology).
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the Joyce Estate used against Shloss and many other scholars, and
numerous other copyright holders have used this tactic against
would-be users of their copyrighted works.117 Moreover, even if the
user sues the copyright holder to have the right to fair use judicially
determined, the copyright holder can at that point simply covenant
not to sue the user and then walk away from the entire suit with
very little cost to itself.118
Thus, preventing fair use of copyrighted work can be done quite
easily and often nearly costlessly by a determined copyright holder.
This is especially the case when the potential user is an academic,
a typical documentary maker, or any other content creator who is
not wealthy enough to absorb the cost of an infringement litigation.
In fact, even parties with deep pockets can be intimidated from
pursuing fair use. For a typical book publisher, film distributor,
music distributor, or the like, the hassle and cost of defending a
copyright litigation based on fair use can turn a profitable project
into an unprofitable one, or at least into one that is not worth the
trouble.119 Moreover, if using numerous quotations based on fair use
would likely draw an infringement suit, then a corporate publisher
is arguably obligated by its profit-making duty to shareholders not
to make the fair use and risk the suit.120
117. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
118. This tactic was used by the Joyce Estate in Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068
(N.D. Cal. 2007). The Estate first issued a covenant not to sue that covered some, but not all,
of Shloss’s website. See Plaintiff ’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss at 17, Shloss,
515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No. C-06-3718 JW). Then the Estate moved to have Shloss’s case
dismissed for not meeting the requirements for a declaratory judgment as to the portion of the
website not covered by the covenant. Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. When the court denied
the Estate’s motion, after considerable effort and cost expended by both sides in briefing and
arguing the motion, the Estate then promptly covenanted not to sue Shloss and the case was
dismissed. Stipulation and Order Dismissing Actions, Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No. C-063718 JW).
119. This is, in fact, what happened in Shloss v. Sweeney. Once the Joyce Estate contacted
Shloss’s publisher and threatened to enforce its legal rights if Shloss’s book was published,
the publisher then cut numerous quotations from the book. See Plaintiff ’s Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss at 1, Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (No. C-06-3718 JW).
120. See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics To Show the Power and Efficiency
of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 605 (2002) (“Since the earlytwentieth century case of Dodge v. Ford, corporations have been deemed to have an
‘unyielding’ duty to look after the interests of the shareholders, which has been translated
into a duty to maximize profits.”) (footnotes omitted); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A
Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could
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There is a second way in which copyright owners can misuse their
copyrights, and this type of misuse is perhaps even more damaging
to First Amendment interests. In many cases an author would like
to use more of a copyrighted work than is allowed by fair use. For
instance, fair use allows a biographer to use excerpts from letters
written by the subject of the biography, but the biographer might
want to include full versions of certain letters in his book. Likewise,
a filmmaker might want to include music or video clips in his film
that exceed the limits of fair use. In these cases the subsequent
creator must seek a license from the copyright owner. In the normal
case, a license is negotiated for a fee, and the subsequent user
includes the portions of the copyrighted work for which she has
bargained. In some cases, however, copyright holders use the
negotiations over licensing their work to exert control over others’
speech. These copyright holders demand that, in exchange for a
license to use the copyrighted work, certain topics may not be discussed, or may only be discussed in a favorable way—or in a
negative way—depending on the axe the copyright owner has to
grind. Other copyright holders demand that, in exchange for a copyright license, the author must agree not to research, investigate, or
write about certain things or pursue certain areas of inquiry. The
Joyce Estate engaged in exactly this sort of behavior in its copyright
license to Brenda Maddox, pursuant to which she was forced
literally to rip out a section of her printed books.121 Not only is this
damaging to the scholars who take restrictive licenses, it is also
damaging to the public, who now gets only part of the story and may
be misled into believing that there is no more to be known, when the
author is actually sitting on relevant facts and analysis that cannot
be distributed due to the copyright license. This sort of conditional
licensing is currently allowed, but under my proposal in Part V it
would become presumptive misuse.
Developments in copyright law in the last decade, such as the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), have exacerbated the
situation by providing copyright holders with new tools for blocking
Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (2001) (“[S]ome of the most
prominent scholars in corporate law ... have written that corporations should, with only some
small exceptions, seek to maximize profits even when they must break the law to do so.”).
121. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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the use of their works.122 The DMCA makes it illegal to circumvent
security or encryption technology on digital works. The DMCA was
intended to protect things like music and movies from being copied
and distributed. Unfortunately, however, copyright holders can use
the DMCA to deter fair use because, even if copying a particular
part of a digital work is plainly fair, if the work is encrypted or
protected by security measures, then altering those measures to
make the fair use is a separate violation for which would-be fair
users can be sued.
In stark contrast to the additional tools that copyright holders
have in digital security technology and the DMCA, would-be fair
users are left with a fair use defense that is fixed in its codified form
and lacks the flexibility of common law to adapt to new challenges
in copyright law.123 Taken together, this leads to an imbalance
between copyright protection and protection of the public domain.124
Thus, a need exists to make practically available the fair use and
idea/expression dichotomy protections for new authors, especially in
the case of critical works.125 This Article argues that a defense of
copyright misuse is the way to make these protections practically
available, but before discussing copyright misuse, Part III briefly
surveys other proposals that have been made to better enable the
protections granted by fair use.

122. See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2003)
(“Paracopyright as conferred by the DMCA constitutes a separate set of rights, quite distinct
from any copyright in the underlying content. These new rights are expansive and
unprecedented. They allow control of uncopyrighted materials, and confer upon content
owners a new exclusive right to control not only access to technologically protected works, but
also ancillary technologies related to content protection.”).
123. See Harris, supra note 90, at 108.
124. See Mazzone, supra note 89, at 1029 (“Copyright law suffers from a basic defect: The
law’s strong protections for copyrights are not balanced by explicit protections for the public
domain.”).
125. See Posting of Richard Posner to Lessig.org/blog, http://www.lessig.org/blog/2004/
08/fair_use_and_misuse.html (Aug. 24, 2004, 18:57 EST) (“What to do about such abuses of
copyright? One possibility ... is to deem copyright overclaiming a form of copyright misuse,
which could result in forfeiture of the copyright.”).
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III. SURVEY OF PREVIOUS PROPOSALS TO ENABLE FAIR USE RIGHTS
Many commentators have noted problems with the imbalance
between protecting copyright holders and allowing legal, socially
valuable fair use. A number of reform proposals have been made to
try to remedy this problem. My proposal is not to change the
contours of fair use but rather to increase the leverage of would-be
fair users so that they are not chilled from making their fair uses.
The reform proposals seeking to address the problem of the
practical ineffectiveness of fair use can be broadly grouped into the
following three categories: proposals to decrease the costs of fair use
determinations; proposals to decrease the penalties of being
adjudged an infringer notwithstanding a good-faith belief that the
use was fair; and proposals to modify copyright law or the fair use
test itself so as to make fair use determinations more predictable or
otherwise better serve the policy goals underlying copyright and fair
use.126
A number of commentators have suggested that one way to make
fair use rights more practically available is to decrease the cost of
obtaining a fair use decision. As discussed in Part III, with average
copyright suits costing hundreds of thousands of dollars127 and fair
use determinations being subject to high degrees of uncertainty, it
is not practical for many would-be fair users to exercise their fair
use rights.128 This uncertainty and costliness has led a number of
commentators to suggest ways to make the fair use determination
more cost effective.
A popular recent suggestion for decreasing the costs of fair use
determinations is to allow an administrative body to make fair use
determinations rather than requiring a full litigation of copyright
126. My division of reform proposals into three categories is quite similar to the division
made by Michael Carroll. See Carroll, supra note 9, at 1123 (“There are four options for
overcoming the problems caused by fair use uncertainty: (1) reduce the costs of obtaining a
fair use determination ex ante under the current legal standard; (2) reduce the ex post
penalties for misjudging fair use in good faith; (3) sharpen the fuzzy edges of the doctrine by
establishing clearly delineated safe harbors or by making the entire doctrine more rule-like;
or (4) implement a combination of these measures.”).
127. See Lemley, supra note 114, at 311.
128. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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infringement and fair use. David Nimmer was one of the first to
make this suggestion;129 he proposed creating administrative tribunals to make fair use determinations in a cost-effective manner.130
Michael Carroll has proposed a variant of this administrative
solution.131 Carroll’s proposal uses as models the Internal Revenue
Service’s practice of issuing private letter rulings regarding the tax
consequences of certain practices and the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s practice of issuing “no action” letters that exempt
certain securities practices from enforcement.132 Carroll suggests
that these practices should inform our approach to fair use and
provide the model for how to make cost-effective fair use
decisions.133 Carroll suggests creating a “Fair Use Board” in the
Copyright Office that “would have the power to declare a proposed
use of another’s copyrighted work to be a fair use.”134 The fair use
determination would be only as to the specific use by the specific
petitioner.135 If the Board determined the use to be fair, then the
petitioner would be immune from copyright liability.136 The
copyright owner would receive notice and have an opportunity to
participate in the Board’s adjudicatory process, and the Board’s
rulings could be appealed within the Copyright Office and ultimately to federal courts of appeals.137
David Fagundes has proposed another variant of an administrative determination of fair use.138 Fagundes also proposes creating a
board within the Copyright Office to make fair use determinations.139 Recognizing that there are both easy and hard cases for fair
use, Fagundes proposes that the board would issue one of three
findings after reviewing the parties’ submissions: “probably in-

129. See David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal To Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 12 (2006).
130. Id.
131. See Carroll, supra note 9, at 1123.
132. Id. at 1090-91.
133. Id. at 1128-29, 1138.
134. Id. at 1087.
135. See id. at 1125-27.
136. Id. at 1126.
137. Id. at 1126-28.
138. See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 183 (2009).
139. Id.
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fringing, probably not infringing, or no opinion.”140 Moreover, the
board’s findings would give “strong presumption[s]” in the direction
of the board’s finding but would not preclude litigation of the
issue.141 Fagundes suggests this approach so that easy cases of fair
use can be quickly determined while hard cases of fair use will be
left directly to litigation.142
Finally, two scholars have suggested that regulators might
promulgate rules on fair use, as well as decide fair use cases. Jason
Mazzone has suggested two ways in which an administrative agency could administer fair use.143 First, he suggests that an agency be
assigned responsibility for “generating regulations that determine
what constitutes fair use in specific contexts” and what conduct by
copyright owners that deters fair use is out of bounds.144 Mazzone
further suggests that, in addition to issuing fair use regulations,
an agency can adjudicate whether specific uses are fair,145 much
like the proposals of Carroll and Fagundes. Ben Depoorter has a
similar proposal by which an administrative agency would issue
guidelines that set “explicit understanding[s] of new technology”
and “set default positions” regarding “expectations of free use of new
technologies.”146
A second area of proposed reform is in the area of decreasing the
penalties for attempting fair use. Many would-be fair users would
proceed with their proposed uses of copyrighted materials but for
the penalties for being adjudged a copyright infringer. The Copyright Act provides that a copyright owner may, without any showing
of actual damages, collect statutory damages of $750 to $30,000 per
work infringed, with possible enhancement up to $150,000.147
Accordingly, various reform proposals have been suggested to reign
in or eliminate statutory damages in cases in which fair use is
asserted in good faith.148
140. Id. at 184.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Mazzone, supra note 89, at 396.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 436-37.
146. See Depoorter, supra note 9, at 1867.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)-(2) (2006).
148. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1271, 1300 (2008); Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW
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A third set of proposals takes on fair use directly. Many commentators have suggested ways to make fair use less murky so that
parties could better predict whether uses are fair ex ante.149 Others
have suggested reforms to fair use aimed at better serving the
underlying policies of copyright law.150

& CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 200 (2007); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 8, at 501.
149. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1525, 1687 (2004) (suggesting the use of pattern analysis to both unify the
application of fair use and make it more predictable while preserving a robust fair use zone);
Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1909-10
(2007) (proposing that Congress enact a number of nonexclusive fair use safe harbors);
William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred,
92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1643-52 (2004) (proposing the creation of judge-made safe harbors for
fair use); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541-43
(2009) (arguing that analyzing fair use cases in light of cases previously decided in the same
“policy-relevant cluster” makes fair use determinations more predictable); Maureen McCrann,
Note, A Modest Proposal: Granting Presumptive Fair Use Protection for Musical Parodies, 14
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 96, 124 (2009) (urging that “an affirmative presumption of fair
use protection should be granted to musical re-writes”).
150. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85
WASH. U. L.R. 969, 1028 (2007) (proposing that fair use should focus on whether there is harm
to the original work’s market, and proposing that courts should shift the burden of proof for
the market harm factor); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1744-95 (1988) (proposing a “utopian” approach to fair use designed to
facilitate human flourishing through deliberately considering whether particular fair use
decisions would increase people’s access to, and ability to engage in, creative work); Robert
Kasunic, Is That All There Is? Reflections on the Nature of the Second Fair Use Factor, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 529, 530 (2008) (proposing reinvigoration of second factor); Joseph P. Liu,
Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 572 (2008) (urging conversion of fair use
from a four-factor test to a two-factor balancing of “(1) the purpose and character of the use”
against “(2) the impact of the use on the market”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market
Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 999, 1023 (2002) (proposing that in deciding fair
use cases, courts determine whether there is a meaningful likelihood of harm to the
copyrighted work’s market value; whether the proposed use will reduce the copyright owner’s
revenues and the output of creative works; and whether, having considered all of this, “society
would be better or worse off ” allowing the use); Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and
the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 406 (2005) (arguing that
“the case for fair use is strongest when the defendant can persuasively argue that the value
of her activity to society clearly outweighs even stipulated loss to the copyright owner,” and
thus proposing that the Copyright Act be amended to state that “[e]xclusive rights in
copyright shall not extend to any use of a copyrighted work that society regularly values in
itself ”); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 396 (2005) (suggesting that in deciding
fair use cases, judges forgo cost-benefit analyses and restrict their analyses to “principles
derived from copyright law”).
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IV. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT MISUSE
Notwithstanding the numerous meritorious proposals to reform
copyright law and fair use, the problem remains that the fair use
rights that are already granted by law under the statute are not
practically available to many would-be fair users. The companion
problem of copyright holders tying copyright licenses to the
requirement that the subsequent authors grant the copyright
owners editorial control also remains. But a potential solution is
available that can make fair use rights more practically available
and discourage copyright holders from controlling the speech of
others through aggressive copyright licensing practices. The
solution lies in the equitable defense of copyright misuse, which has
unique characteristics that make it well-suited to protect against
uses of copyright that impinge on speech interests. To serve this
function, however, copyright misuse must be decoupled from its
traditional basis in antitrust law and instead be firmly grounded in
First Amendment speech principles.
Copyright misuse is at something of a crossroads right now. It
grew out of its analog in patent misuse, and like patent misuse,
copyright misuse has traditionally been used to address antitrust
concerns—generally in a shorthanded fashion that does not involve
all of the requirements of antitrust analysis.151 Numerous commentators have made telling critiques of the shorthand version of
antitrust analysis that courts have engaged in when deciding
misuse defenses.152 These critiques are fairly persuasive. Part IV
shows that there also has been a shift in economic thinking in
antitrust cases, such that the Supreme Court has said it is inappropriate to find anticompetitive behavior simply from an instance of
a patent or copyright owner tying sales of its patented or copyrighted goods to requirements to also buy other goods.153 Thus, a
defense of misuse based in antitrust policies may be inevitably on
the decline. I argue, however, that while this fate may be appropri151. See infra Part IV.A.
152. See infra Part IV.B.
153. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42-43 (2006) (holding that a patent
does not automatically confer market power and overturning prior cases holding the contrary).
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ate for patent misuse, copyright misuse should not wither away, but
instead should be refocused and grounded in First Amendment
speech interests. Once refocused, this doctrine can provide practical
protections for speech and fair use interests that are provided by
law but are often practically unavailable due to the unequal
bargaining positions between copyright holders and those who
would reuse portions of copyrighted works. Specifically, copyright
misuse is unique as a defense because it focuses on the actions of
the copyright holder, while other copyright defenses focus squarely
on the actions of the alleged infringer.154 In addition, a defendant
can raise the equitable defense of misuse based on a copyright
owner’s misuse of its copyright against any person, not just the
defendant.155 These two qualities of the existing misuse defense,
when combined with the First Amendment focus advocated by this
Article, would provide substantial incentive for copyright holders to
avoid any instances of misuse,156 and would encourage new authors
to create new critical or transformative speech that they have the
legal right to make under fair use and the First Amendment.
Part IV explains the evolution of copyright misuse and the
critiques of antitrust-based misuse. Part V lays out the case for
shifting the policy basis for the copyright misuse defense firmly to
First Amendment principles.
154. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 179-84 (2001) (advocating a return to
a copyright framework that is comprehensible to ordinary consumers); Kathryn Judge, Note,
Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L. REV. 901, 915 (2004) (“Copyright misuse is one of
the only copyright-limiting doctrines that arises from actions taken by the copyright holder.”);
Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First
Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1306 (1991) (“Unlike misuse doctrine, however,
the fair use inquiry directs courts’ attention to the social value of the defendant’s conduct
rather than the social harm caused by plaintiff ’s use of its copyright.”).
155. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he defense of
copyright misuse is available even if the defendants themselves have not been injured by the
misuse.”).
156. See Judge, supra note 154, at 932-33 (“Cease-and-desist letters can be a legitimate
means for copyright holders to prevent ongoing copyright infringement. If a copyright holder
uses such letters for this purpose by sending letters only to parties he reasonably believes are
engaged in infringement and the letters accurately state the copyright holder’s rights and the
potential ramifications for infringement, he will likely be engaged in a lawful exercise of his
rights. As such, he should not be prevented from seeking relief, including injunctive relief,
from the courts. Without a vibrant doctrine of copyright misuse, however, a copyright holder
has no incentive not to abuse this lawful tool. He could send such letters to anyone who
criticizes his product, and he could exaggerate or even lie about the potential repercussions.”).
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A. Copyright Misuse’s Growth out of Antitrust-Based Patent
Misuse
The doctrine of copyright misuse is an equitable defense similar
to the common law doctrine of unclean hands.157 It is based on the
notion that courts should deny any relief to a plaintiff if he has
come to the court while engaging in improper behavior himself.
Correspondingly, a finding of copyright misuse bars the plaintiff
from recovering any damages or injunctive relief for so long as the
misuse continues.158 It is important to note that a plaintiff can cure
his improper behavior and return to court to seek relief against an
alleged infringer.159
The roots of copyright misuse lie in the analogous doctrine of
patent misuse. In Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., the
Supreme Court first recognized the defense of patent misuse in a
case involving tying arrangements.160 Tying is the practice of making a sale or license of a product contingent on the purchase of some
other good. In Morton Salt, the plaintiff licensed a patented machine
for depositing salt tablets into cans and required its licensees to also
purchase its salt tablets, which were not covered under the scope of
the patent.161 The Court found that this practice was an impermissible attempt to expand the reach of the patent.162 The Court held that
157. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine
of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 865, 867 (2000) (“Intellectual property misuse is a common law defense to infringement
that derives from the equitable doctrine of ‘unclean hands.’”); Note, supra note 154, at 1295
(“[C]ourts generally have viewed misuse doctrine as deriving from the equitable principle of
unclean hands.”).
158. John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu, Competition Law and Copyright Misuse, 56 DRAKE L.
REV. 427, 458-59 (2008) (“Rather than criminal penalties or treble damages under U.S.
antitrust law, the sole penalty for copyright misuse is the inability to sue for infringement.
That penalty exists only so long as the misuse continues .... The doctrine of ‘unclean hands’
is a traditional defense available in actions in equity. It applies when the party bringing suit
has engaged in certain questionable conduct in connection with the action and when the
conduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant the denial of relief.”).
159. See Jennifer R. Knight, Comment, Copyright Misuse v. Freedom of Contract: And the
Winner Is..., 73 TENN. L. REV. 237, 261 (2006); see also Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 979 n.22 (“This
holding, of course, is not an invalidation of Lasercomb’s copyright. Lasercomb is free to bring
a suit for infringement once it has purged itself of the misuse.”).
160. 314 U.S. 488, 494 (1942).
161. Id. at 490.
162. Id. at 491. Note that by determining that Morton Salt’s patent was unenforceable due
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Morton Salt’s misuse of its patent meant that the plaintiff could not
pursue its patent infringement suit against the defendant, who was
a competitor of Morton Salt in manufacturing and selling saltinjecting equipment as well as unpatented salt tablets.163 Thus, the
sanction accompanying a finding of misuse can be severe. Once the
Court determined that Morton’s conduct with its patent, that is, the
effort to tie the license to other purchases with respect to at least
some licensees, was inappropriate, the Court denied Morton Salt
any ability to pursue a patent claim against the defendant. This was
the outcome even though the defendant had no contractual relationship with Morton and was allegedly manufacturing and selling a
directly infringing machine.164 Although the general rule for patent
misuse is that a patent owner can assert its patents again once it
has cured the misuse,165 the Court in Morton Salt did not indicate
openness to any assertion of the patent right in the future.166 Thus,
Morton Salt’s bad behavior with its patent against some licensees
ultimately prevented Morton Salt from enforcing its patent against
anyone.
Since Morton Salt, the doctrine of patent misuse has been further
developed by the courts.167 Though the doctrine relies greatly on
antitrust law, courts have taken a looser, more shorthand approach
to analyzing potentially anticompetitive conduct in patent misuse
cases than when they do in antitrust cases.168 First, the burden of
proof for defendants invoking misuse is different than for a plainto patent misuse, the Court decided the issue of anticompetitive conduct without requiring
Morton Salt’s competitor to prove the traditional elements of an antitrust tying claim: market
power, market foreclosure, or injury to competition. For further discussion of this tactic, see
James B. Kobak, Jr., The Misuse Defense and Intellectual Property Litigation, 1 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 2 ¶ 7 (1995).
163. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490-91.
164. Id. at 494.
165. See B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating
that the sanction for patent misuse is that the patent is rendered unenforceable until the
misuse has been cured).
166. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
167. Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 157, at 868 (“Today, patent misuse is a wellestablished doctrine where courts generally apply antitrust principles to determine whether
a patentee’s use is misuse.”).
168. See Cross & Yu, supra note 158, at 457 (“On the surface, Lasercomb looks much like
an antitrust case. When one digs deeper, however, there are several important differences
between the doctrine of copyright misuse and the antitrust law doctrines discussed earlier.”).
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tiff in an antitrust case. Patent misuse seems to require neither
the showing of dominant market position in the tying good nor
the showing of direct harm to the defendant that is required in
tying cases under antitrust law.169 Second, as an equitable defense,
misuse bars a finding of infringement, but does not entitle the
defendant to any kind of damages from the plaintiff.170 But as
Morton Salt showed,171 even though no money damages can be
asserted against a patent owner via patent misuse, the prohibition
on enforcing its patent rights against anyone can be a powerful
deterrent to a patent owner.
In 1988, Congress codified the patent misuse defense.172 The
codification was done largely to specify some limits to the defense,
as Congress made clear by calling the bill the Patent Misuse Reform
Act.173 Reflecting a growing understanding that not all tying
agreements related to patented goods are anticompetitive, the
statute also prohibits the patent misuse defense based on tying
unless the defendant can show that the patent owner had market
power in the patented product.174
The first time a court applied the misuse defense to copyright
came six years after Morton Salt in the case of M. Witmark & Sons
v. Jensen.175 Here too the court based its copyright misuse inquiry
in antitrust policy and looked at whether the copyright holders had
used their copyrights in anticompetitive ways.176 The conduct at
issue was another tying arrangement, this time with respect to
copyrighted music instead of patented goods.177 Defendants were
movie theater owners who were sued by the American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) for showing movies
169. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992); see also
Ekstrand, supra note 91, at 571 (“Antitrust law requires the demonstration of anticompetitive
practice by those with dominant market position. Those patentees who misuse their grant are
not required to be major market players. Furthermore, antitrust actions require a showing
of harm to the plaintiff.”) (footnote omitted).
170. Cross & Yu, supra note 158, at 458.
171. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 494.
172. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006).
173. Patent Misuse Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)-(5)).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5).
175. 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948).
176. Id. at 847-49.
177. Id. at 848-49.
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without licensing the public performance rights to the music
contained in the movies.178 The motion picture producers purchased
synchronization rights, which gave only the right to synchronize the
music with the movie as part of the movie soundtrack. Individual
movie theaters wishing to show the movies were left to purchase
performance licenses for the music directly from ASCAP.179 For
years ASCAP provided blanket licenses to movie theaters so that
the theaters could show any movies in which ASCAP member
artists had copyrights.180 Defendants claimed that the nature of the
movie distribution business meant that they only learned shortly
before exhibition what movies they would be showing.181 Thus,
although defendants had the legal right to individually negotiate
licenses with each artist holding a copyright in the music in each
movie, as a practical matter, there was no time to complete individual licenses before the movie opened in their theaters.182 The
defendants thus accused ASCAP of having a business practice that
allowed ASCAP to hold up theater owners for licenses to the music
in the movies.183 Defendants seemed to believe that if the movie
producers negotiated for public performance licenses along with
their synchronization licenses, then ASCAP would not be able to
charge such high prices for the music, or the movie producers could
negotiate with the individual copyright holders directly. Because of
ASCAP’s licensing practices, however, over 80 percent of theaters
purchased blanket licenses from ASCAP.184
Eventually, some theater owners refused to purchase performance licenses for the music of some movies they showed, and
178. Id. at 844.
179. Id. at 844-45.
180. Id. at 845-56.
181. Id. at 845.
182. Id.
183. Id. (“The performance rights of any musical composition controlled by A[SCAP] may
be licensed singly, but it appears that A[SCAP’s] copyrighted music is always licensed as a
group under a blanket license from A[SCAP]. And while the copyright owners, including the
plaintiffs herein ... may deal individually with anyone seeking a license for the performance
of their compositions publicly for profit, it seems that, in the licensing of the performance
rights of the music integrated in a sound film, as a matter of practice theatre owners have but
little opportunity to obtain licenses from the many individual copyright owners belonging to
A[SCAP] who may have copyrighted music in the particular film purchased by the theatre
owner.”).
184. Id. at 849.
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ASCAP sued. Defendants argued that under the circumstances,
ASCAP was tying a requirement to license all of its music in a
blanket license to the licensing of the music in the movies.185 The
court found that the tying arrangement violated antitrust law and
constituted misuse.186 The court held that ASCAP was improperly
trying to extend the copyright owners’ rights to compensation for
individual songs to a requirement that theater owners license all
ASCAP songs.187 Importantly, the court did not bother to determine
whether antitrust law gave the defendants the right not to purchase
ASCAP’s blanket licenses. Instead, the court held that the finding
of misuse sufficed as a reason to refuse to enforce the plaintiffs’
copyrights against any theater owners.188 This provides an example
of a court using copyright to enforce antitrust values without
needing to determine whether all of the elements for the proposed
remedy could be found in antitrust law. It also shows the powerful
effect of a finding of copyright misuse. The plaintiffs were unable to
enforce their copyrights against the theater owners, who were thus
left to engage freely in activity that otherwise was plainly infringing: publicly performing copyrighted music without a performance
license.
More recently, additional courts have recognized a defense of
copyright misuse, some of them on grounds not based solely in
antitrust concerns. In the 1990 case of Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds, the Fourth Circuit considered whether restrictive license
provisions constituted misuse.189 Lasercomb America licensed manufacturing die design software to users with a license provision
requiring licensees not to create a competing product for ninety-nine
years.190 Holiday Steel, defendant Reynolds’s employer, created just

185. Id. at 845.
186. Id. at 848-49.
187. Id. at 850 (“One who unlawfully exceeds his copyright monopoly and violates the antitrust laws is not outside the pale of the law, but where the Court’s aid is requested, as noted
herein, and the granting thereof would tend to serve the plaintiffs in their plan ... to extend
their copyrights in a monopolistic control beyond their proper scope, it should be denied.”).
188. Id. (“In view of the Court’s finding that the copyright monopoly has been extended, it
is not necessary to determine whether anti-trust violations alone would deprive plaintiffs of
the right of recovery.”).
189. 911 F.2d 970, 972-73 (4th Cir. 1990).
190. Id. at 973.
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such a product and was sued for infringement.191 Holiday Steel had
received the agreement requiring it not to create a competing product, but it never signed and returned the document.192 Holiday
Steel then proceeded to break Lasercomb’s copy protections and
make extra, unlicensed copies of Lasercomb’s software for its
internal use.193 Holiday Steel eventually made additional copies of
Lasercomb’s software, tried to disguise it as its own, and marketed
the software as its own.194 When it learned of Holiday Steel’s
activities, Lasercomb promptly sued for, inter alia, copyright
infringement.195
The defendants argued that Lasercomb should not be allowed
to enforce its copyrights against them because Lasercomb had
misused its copyright by requiring licensees not to create competing products for ninety-nine years.196 The district court dismissed
this argument because the defendants had not signed the agreement.197 But the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that because
some licensees did sign the agreement, Lasercomb had misused its
copyright and therefore could not enforce it against anyone, including those who did not sign the agreement, like Holiday Steel.198
The Lasercomb court held that by preventing licensees from
entering the product space, the plaintiff had impermissibly used its
copyright to protect an idea rather than its expression.199 The court
held that showing an antitrust violation was not essential to
establish misuse.200 Instead, a plaintiff need only use its copyright
in a manner that violates the public policies underlying copyright
191. Id. at 971-72.
192. Id. at 973.
193. Id. at 971.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 972.
196. Id. at 972-73.
197. Id. at 973.
198. Id. at 979.
199. Id. at 978 (“Lasercomb undoubtedly has the right to protect against copying of the
Interact code. Its standard licensing agreement, however, goes much further and essentially
attempts to suppress any attempt by the licensee to independently implement the idea which
Interact expresses.”).
200. Id. (“So while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law
probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright defense, the converse is not necessarily
true—a misuse need not be a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable
defense to an infringement action.”).
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law to commit misuse.201 Although the court couched its language in
terms of public policy, the court based its finding of copyright
misuse on Lasercomb’s anticompetitive behavior; specifically, the
court did not approve of Lasercomb’s licensing of its copyright based
on the agreement that its licensees would not compete with
Lasercomb for ninety-nine years.202 The court did not set forth a new
basis for finding misuse, but rather used misuse as a shorthand way
to avoid a full antitrust inquiry—the court did not consider market
power, for instance—even though agreements not to compete and
improper use of market power to prevent competition are core
behaviors that antitrust law seeks to prevent.203
Instead, the court stated that any use of a copyright to “secure an
exclusive right or limited monopoly” beyond the copyright grant is
contrary to the public policy of copyright.204 Under this tautological
formulation, any licensing requirements found to be unrelated to
the rights under the copyright grant can be subject to attack as
misuse. Moreover, by ignoring the antitrust law that has grown up
to make sophisticated judgments about when license restrictions or
tying is anticompetitive, the court left itself open to crude judgments
about competition that did not reflect the maturity of antitrust law.
Nevertheless, Lasercomb marked the first time a court explicitly
found copyright misuse and denied relief to a plaintiff based on the
doctrine alone. Since the 1990 ruling, several courts have considered

201. Id. (“The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of
antitrust law (such as whether the licensing agreement is ‘reasonable’), but whether the
copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a
copyright.”).
202. Id. at 978-79.
203. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) (stating that
the purpose of antitrust law is “to prevent undue restraints of interstate commerce, to
maintain its appropriate freedom in the public interest, [and] to afford protection from the
subversive or coercive interferences of monopolistic endeavor”); United States v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (“‘[R]estraint of trade’ at common law and in the law of this
country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-trust Act only embraced acts or contracts or
agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly
restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which, either because
of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously
restrained trade.”).
204. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976 (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S.
488, 492 (1942)).
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similar cases and adopted the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of
misuse.
The Ninth Circuit adopted Lasercomb’s approach in Practice
Management Information Corp. v. American Medical Ass’n, which
involved another restrictive license provision as a basis for finding
misuse.205 The American Medical Association (AMA) copyrighted a
series of codes used for designating medical procedures and licensed
their use with the provision that the licensee use no other system of
codes.206 The Ninth Circuit held that the AMA had misused its
copyright on the same grounds as in Lasercomb, specifically, for
licensing the copyright in the codes on the condition that licensees
not use a competitor’s service.207 The court also stated that a strict
violation of antitrust law was not necessary to show misuse.208 But
the court still based its finding of misuse on the same policy
concerns underlying antitrust law. The court clearly thought the
AMA’s requirement of exclusive dealing from its copyright licensees
was anticompetitive.
In Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
joined the Fourth and Ninth Circuits in recognizing copyright
misuse, also relying on an implicit antitrust violation.209 In Alcatel,
the plaintiff sued DGI for infringement because DGI reverse
engineered copyrighted software in order to produce compatible
replacement hardware used in Alcatel telephone switches.210 Alcatel
did not possess patents on the telephone switches themselves but
had copyrighted the operating system controlling the switch.211 The
court found that Alcatel misused its copyright by leveraging it to
claim patent-like protection over the hardware.212 The court held
205. 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
206. Id. at 517-18.
207. Id. at 520 (“On the undisputed facts in the record before us, we conclude the AMA
misused its copyright by licensing the CPT to HCFA in exchange for HCFA’s agreement not
to use a competing coding system.”).
208. Id. at 521 (“We agree with the Fourth Circuit that a defendant in a copyright
infringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse
defense.”).
209. 166 F.3d 772, 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1999).
210. Id. at 784-85.
211. Id. at 777.
212. Id. at 793 (“DSC indirectly seeks to obtain patent-like protection of its hardware—its
microprocessor card—through the enforcement of its software copyright.”).
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that Alcatel’s anticompetitive practices with regard to trying to
extend its copyrights to cover hardware constituted misuse.213
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the extension of misuse to
copyright, but some scholars believe that several cases indicate
possible acceptance by the Court.214 These cases each involve
activities that raise antitrust-type concerns about anticompetitive
behavior. In each case, defendants raised misuse defenses, but
the Court ultimately decided for the defendants solely on antitrust grounds. In United States v. Loew’s, Inc. and United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., the Court found block booking to be a
violation of antitrust law using logic similar to patent misuse
decisions.215 Block booking is very similar to tying; copyright owners
make licenses to popular works contingent on the purchase of
licenses to less desirable content.216 Theoretically, this allows
copyright owners to leverage their economic power beyond their
copyright monopoly.217 The Court accordingly held that the practice
was anticompetitive, violating the antitrust laws.218 But the
opinions also included language suggesting that the copyright
owners were engaged in activities that misused their copyrights by

213. Id. at 793-94 (“Any competing microprocessor card developed for use on DSC phone
switches must be compatible with DSC’s copyrighted operating system software. In order to
ensure that its card is compatible, a competitor such as DGI must test the card on a DSC
phone switch. Such a test necessarily involves making a copy of DSC’s copyrighted operating
system, which copy is downloaded into the card’s memory when the card is booted up. If DSC
is allowed to prevent such copying, then it can prevent anyone from developing a competing
microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card.”).
214. See Scott A. Miskimon, Note, Divorcing Public Policy from Economic Reality: The
Fourth Circuit’s Copyright Misuse Doctrine in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 1672, 1683-84 (1991) (“In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. the Supreme
Court implicitly recognized the copyright misuse defense .... In United States v. Loew’s, Inc.
the ... Court’s specific reference to the patent misuse defense ... in conjunction with its uniform
application of the antitrust laws to both patents and copyrights, suggests that the Loew’s
Court tacitly approved of a copyright misuse defense.”) (footnotes omitted).
215. See United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 39, 45-46 (1962); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-57 (1948); see also Ekstrand, supra note 91, at
572.
216. See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 156.
217. But see infra notes 255-65 and accompanying text for critiques of whether tying
actually allows monopolists to increase their economic power.
218. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. at 39; Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 156-59.
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attempting to use them to capture additional exclusive rights
outside of their copyright grants.219
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. (BMI) involved somewhat
similar facts.220 In that case, the Supreme Court considered a
Second Circuit finding that Broadcast Music had committed a per
se violation of antitrust law and had committed copyright misuse.221
In BMI, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) sued the
copyright royalty collecting societies of ASCAP and BMI, as well as
their members and affiliates, alleging antitrust violations and
copyright misuse for the two societies’ practice of issuing blanket
licenses to television stations like CBS for use of copyrighted music
in television programming.222 CBS alleged that ASCAP and BMI’s
practice of issuing blanket licenses amounted to price fixing by the
individual copyright-holding members of the two societies.223 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the blanket licenses at issue
were not naked restraints on trade with only anticompetitive
purposes.224 Rather, the Court held that the license had the
procompetitive features of integrating sales and allowing monitoring
and enforcement against unauthorized copying.225 The blanket
license also drastically diminished transaction costs by allowing
purchasers to buy only one license rather than negotiating for each

219. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. at 49 (“Accommodation between the statutorily dispensed
monopoly in the combination of contents in the patented or copyrighted product and the
statutory principles of free competition demands that extension of the patent or copyright
monopoly by the use of tying agreements be strictly confined.”); Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
at 154 (“[T]he pooling of the purchasing power of an entire circuit in bidding for films is a
misuse of monopoly power.”).
220. 441 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1979).
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 4.
223. Id. at 4, 6. CBS did not make the tying argument that was successful for plaintiffs in
M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen that ASCAP and BMI were tying the license of any one
copyrighted work to the requirement to purchase a blanket license. Such a claim would not
have been successful because ASCAP and BMI had only the right to make nonexclusive
licenses of their members’ copyrighted works. Id. at 4-5. Thus, television stations were free
to negotiate directly with copyright owners if they wished. Moreover, since the television
stations were in charge of their own programming, they could not very well argue that they
were ignorant about what licenses they would need until the last minute, as did the plaintiffs
in Witmark. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843, 844-45 (D. Minn. 1948).
224. Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 20.
225. Id.
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song they wanted to use.226 Accordingly, the Court reversed the
holding of per se antitrust violation and remanded for analysis
under the rule of reason.227 The Court also reversed the copyright
misuse ruling because the Court viewed it as dependent on the
antitrust claim.228 BMI is another example of copyright misuse
claims that are closely tied to, if not duplicative of, antitrust claims.
In BMI, once the Court held that the actions of the defendants had
potential procompetitive features, the copyright misuse claim could
not stand.229 Thus, although the Supreme Court has explicitly
endorsed the patent misuse defense, it has never explicitly embraced the defense of copyright misuse. The Court has never
condemned copyright misuse as a defense and seems to think it may
be appropriate where antitrust violations can be shown, but it has
thus far not embraced the doctrine outright.
More recently, a few lower courts have hinted at, though not fully
embraced, a First Amendment basis for copyright misuse. The 1991
district court case of QAD, Inc. v. ALN Associates, Inc. concerned
copyrighted software.230 The court allowed a copyright misuse
defense based on fraudulent claims the copyright owner made
regarding which software it owned.231 ALN, accused of creating an
infringing product, argued for misuse and alleged that QAD itself
had used software copyrighted by Hewlett Packard in its own
program.232 The court ruled that QAD’s assertion of copyright over

226. Id. at 21-22 (“The blanket license is composed of the individual compositions plus the
aggregating service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts; it is, to some
extent, a different product. The blanket license has certain unique characteristics: It allows
the licensee immediate use of covered compositions, without the delay of prior individual
negotiations and great flexibility in the choice of musical material.”) (footnote omitted).
227. Id. at 24.
228. Id. (“[T]his left the general import of its judgment that the licensing practices of
ASCAP and BMI under the consent decree are per se violations of the Sherman Act. We
reverse that judgment, and the copyright misuse judgment dependent upon it.”).
229. Id. at 20-24.
230. 770 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
231. Id. at 1270-71.
232. Id. at 1267 (“At the core of [QAD’s] copyright misuse is its use of material in
MFG/PRO that is not only not [QAD’s] original work but work that was actually copied from
HP250. Even worse, it was mostly that copied material that formed the focus of [QAD’s] case
against ALN for copyright infringement at the early stages of this litigation, when [QAD]
sought and received injunctive relief against ALN.”) (footnote omitted).
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ALN’s software was a basis for finding copyright misuse.233 But in
addition to basing its copyright misuse decision on QAD’s fraudulent
behavior, the court referenced the First Amendment, stating that
because copyright derives from freedom of expression, a copyright
is misused when improperly asserted to inhibit another’s expression.234
QAD makes clear that misuse based on First Amendment
principles occurs only when another’s expression is improperly and
excessively inhibited.235 In certain situations, copyright allows
owners to silence others despite their First Amendment speech
rights, just as patents can allow monopoly power contrary to
antitrust law. This principle is illustrated in Video Pipeline, Inc. v.
Buena Vista Home Entertainment, in which Video Pipeline accused
Disney, Buena Vista’s owner, of misuse because it included restrictions on criticism of Disney movies in its licensing agreements.236 In
considering the issue, the Third Circuit decided that the misuse
doctrine as defined by Lasercomb was available, but not applicable
given the facts.237 The court reasoned that the restrictions on
criticism did not inhibit licensee expression to such a degree that
would constitute misuse, so the assertion of copyright was proper.238
233. Id. at 1270 (“[QAD] began to misuse its copyright over MFG/PRO when it attempted
to extend its rights over material over which it had no copyright: those portions of its software
that it copied from HP250.... That copyright misuse extended [QAD’s] copyright privilege
beyond the scope of the grant and violated the very purpose of a copyright, which is to give
incentive for authors to produce.”).
234. Id. at 1265 (“Just as freedom of expression is the fount of copyright protection, so a
copyright may not be asserted improperly to inhibit other persons’ freedom of expression.”).
235. Id.
236. 342 F.3d 191, 203 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The Website in which the Trailers are used may not
be derogatory to or critical of the entertainment industry or of [Disney].... As Video Pipeline
sees it, such licensing agreements seek to use copyright law to suppress criticism and, in so
doing, misuse those laws, triggering the copyright misuse doctrine.”).
237. See id. at 206 (“Thus, while we extend the patent misuse doctrine to copyright, and
recognize that it might operate beyond its traditional anticompetition context, we hold it
inapplicable here. On this record Disney’s licensing agreements do not interfere significantly
with copyright policy.”); Neal Hartzog, Gaining Momentum: A Review of Recent Developments
Surrounding the Expansion of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and Analysis of the Doctrine in
Its Current Form, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 373, 387 (2004) (“Although the Third
Circuit ultimately held that the copyright misuse doctrine was not applicable to the copyright
owners, the court ... officially recognized copyright misuse as a legitimate defense and adopted
the public policy ... analysis employed in Lasercomb and Practice Management.”) (footnote
omitted).
238. Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d at 206 (“[W]e nonetheless cannot conclude on this record
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Finally, in Assessment Technologies v. WIREdata, the Seventh
Circuit ruled that the data at issue was not copyrightable, but the
court also suggested that plaintiffs’ claims of copyright when none
existed might be copyright misuse.239 In that case, Assessment
Technologies contracted with municipalities to collect and organize
property value data.240 When WIREdata tried to access this
information, the municipalities refused, fearing they would be guilty
of infringement.241 The Seventh Circuit ruled that copyright did not
protect the raw data and suggested Assessment Technologies may
be guilty of copyright misuse because it claimed protection over
something clearly not included in the copyright grant.242 The court
also suggested that improperly asserting rights over defendants who
lack the resources to resist could be misuse.243
Although the defense of copyright misuse has been growing in
acceptance by the courts,244 the Supreme Court has yet to decide
that misuse is a valid defense, and several circuits still premise
misuse on a showing of anticompetitive behavior.245 This puts the
that the agreements are likely to interfere with creative expression to such a degree that they
affect in any significant way the policy interest in increasing the public store of creative
activity.”).
239. Assessment Techs. of Wis., L.L.C. v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir.
2003).
240. Id. at 642.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 646-47 (“To try by contract or otherwise to prevent the municipalities from
revealing their own data, especially when, as we have seen, the complete data are unavailable
anywhere else, might constitute copyright misuse.”).
243. Id. at 647 (“The argument for applying copyright misuse beyond the bounds of
antitrust ... is that for a copyright owner to use an infringement suit to obtain property
protection, here in data, that copyright law clearly does not confer, hoping to force a
settlement or even achieve an outright victory over an opponent that may lack the resources
or the legal sophistication to resist effectively, is an abuse of process.”).
244. See Hartzog, supra note 237, at 391 (“[T]he Third Circuit has become the fourth
federal circuit court to explicitly adopt the copyright misuse doctrine ..., which signals a
growing acceptance of the doctrine that will likely lead to its adoption in some form by all of
the circuits, and inevitably the Supreme Court.”); Scott A. Sher, Note, In Re Napster Inc.
Copyright Litigation: Defining the Contours of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine, 18 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 325, 329-30 (2002) (“The copyright misuse doctrine as defined
by Lasercomb ... has been expressly recognized by four circuits. Several other circuits have
been more reluctant to adopt the defense, and instead have adopted the doctrine ... only where
the defendant can link the misuse to an actual antitrust violation.”) (footnotes omitted).
245. E.g., G. Gervaise Davis III, The Affirmative Defense of Copyright Misuse and Efforts
To Establish Trademark Misuse, and Fraud on the Copyright Office: Establishing Limitations
on the Scope of Copyright Owners Rights Based on Several Theories, 867 PLI/PAT 103, 126

2010]

FIRST AMENDMENT BASED COPYRIGHT MISUSE

583

copyright misuse defense at a crossroads. For while acceptance of
copyright misuse has grown, in recent years antitrust-based misuse
has been subject to strong criticism, especially in the area of patent
law. If courts accept these criticisms, the defense of antitrust-based
misuse may go into inevitable decline in both patent and copyright
cases. Part V discusses the critiques of antitrust-based misuse and
argues that courts should choose a new road for copyright misuse,
basing it in First Amendment principles.
B. Critiques of Patent and Copyright Misuse Based in Antitrust
Ironically, at a time when copyright misuse seems to be catching
on in the circuit courts as an analog to patent misuse, patent misuse
itself may be on the decline. Although the patent misuse defense
has a long history, its modern standing has been undercut by two
critiques. First, some argue that vindicating antitrust interests
through patent misuse is ill-advised and repetitive of antitrust laws.
Second, because most patent misuse cases involve tying, the shifting
thinking in recent decades on the anticompetitiveness of tying has
undercut some of the rationale for patent misuse. Because these
critiques of patent misuse apply with equal force to copyright
misuse based in antitrust, Part IV.B discusses the critiques of
patent misuse in some detail.
1. Critique One: Antitrust Interests Are Better Vindicated
Directly Through Antitrust Claims
The first critique of the existence of a patent misuse defense
essentially questions the pursuit of a problem indirectly through
patent law that could be handled by antitrust law. The critique
argues that antitrust values can be vindicated directly by antitrust
(2006) (“Among these courts, three schools of thought predominate: (1) the view that misuse
has nothing to do with antitrust principles ..., (2) the view that misuse requires a finding of
antitrust violations ..., and (3) the intermediary approach reminiscent of the Fourth Circuit
in Lasercomb.”); Ekstrand, supra note 91, at 583 (“The courts in these cases ... rejected notions
that plaintiffs must first violate antitrust laws or infringe copyrights for defendants to assert
the defense. However, they represent a small fraction of cases compared to those in which the
misuse defense was predicated upon a violation of antitrust law and a showing of harm to the
defendant infringer.”); Hartzog, supra note 237, at 382.
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law, and that courts seeking to vindicate such interests through the
patent misuse defense tend to ignore tests for anticompetitive
effects—like market power—that are essential to accurately
determining antitrust issues.246 To the extent the misuse defense is
based in antitrust and is thus concerned with tying or other
attempts of the intellectual property holder to extend his patent or
copyright monopoly, critics have argued that the analysis can be
done directly under antitrust law via an antitrust counterclaim in
an infringement suit.247 So long as the concern underlying a misuse
claim is that specific behavior with regard to a patent or copyright
is anticompetitive, there is no reason not to analyze such a claim
within the formal structure of antitrust.248 The possession of market
power via a patent or copyright does not give the patent or copyright
owner any greater opportunities for anticompetitive behavior than
the market power that comes from having monopoly power over any
other resource, which customers or competitors find necessary.249
The relevant inquiry is whether the actions that the monopoly
holder is taking with respect to a particular property— whether it
be intellectual property or something else, like a railroad termi-

246. See Meg Dolan, Misusing Misuse: Why Copyright Misuse Is Unnecessary, 17 DEPAULLCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 207, 236-37 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic
Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1612 (1990).
247. See Roger Arar, Note, Redefining Copyright Misuse, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1311
(1981) (“[C]ourts applying a misuse defense can do no better than to look to substantive
antitrust principles.”); Sean Michael Aylward, Comment, The Fourth Circuit’s Extension of
the Misuse Doctrine to the Area of Copyright: A Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine?, 17 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 661, 692-93 (1992) (noting that relying on antitrust principles for copyright misuse
would “add stability and predictability to the doctrine of misuse”). But see Ilan Charnelle, The
Justification and Scope of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and Its Independence of the Antitrust
Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 167, 198-99 (2002) (arguing that “[c]opyright misuse analysis does
not and should not rest on antitrust law because antitrust law and copyright law view
innovation and creativity in different manners,” but then focusing on determining
inappropriate tying without the benefit of antitrust law).
248. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting holding
patent misuse claims to lower standards than antitrust claims, and explaining that “[o]ur
[patent] law is not rich in ... concepts of monopolistic abuse; and it is rather late in the day to
try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders to debilitating
uncertainty”). But see Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be
the Tie?,” 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (1991) (defending doing shorthand analysis of allegedly
anticompetitive behavior through patent misuse because the antitrust standard is difficult
and expensive).
249. Burchfiel, supra note 248, at 2-3.
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nal—are likely to be more anticompetitive than procompetitive.250
Thus, the antitrust inquiry is similar whether a property owner ties
a noncompete agreement to the license of a patent or to the
provision of some other input that is necessary to a firm’s business.
In either case we should be concerned about anticompetitive effects
to the extent that (1) the input lacks ready substitutes in the
market such that others will not be able to compete for sales
without the ability to make that input, (2) investing in making a
substitute to the input is not practical, (3) there are no other factors
that will discipline the monopolist’s anticompetitive use of the input,
and (4) there are no offsetting procompetitive effects.
Antitrust doctrine has decades of experience working through the
examination of these questions. In contrast, courts in patent misuse
cases have often made rough determinations of competitive effects
without the formal requirements of antitrust law. This shorthand
analysis increases the likelihood of erroneous decisions because it
ignores some of the elements necessary to find an antitrust
violation, and thus ignores the considered wisdom of the courts over
more than a century since the enactment of federal antitrust laws.251
2. Critique Two: Patent Uses that Courts Have Ruled
Anticompetitive in the Past Actually May Be Harmless or Even
Procompetitive
In Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., the Supreme
Court officially recognized that patents and copyrights do not
necessarily give their owners market power.252 In that case, the
Court acknowledged that if there are market substitutes for the
patented or copyrighted product, then the owner of the product will
not be able to charge above-market prices because consumers will
250. Id. at 79-80.
251. But see Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional Copyright
Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 423-24 (1994) (arguing that a narrow application of
misuse independent of antitrust can take into account harm to long-term innovation that
antitrust cannot adequately protect); Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1922, 1934-35 (1997) (arguing that there may be reason to apply the patent misuse
defense to a larger scope of activity than antitrust law so as to protect innovation markets,
but acknowledging the difficulty of coming up with an administrable system for deciding such
misuse defenses).
252. 547 U.S. 28, 35, 42 (2006).
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simply switch to available substitute goods if the patent or copyright
owner raises her prices.253 Thus, in many cases a patent or copyright
gives its owner the right to exclude others from making exactly the
patented or copyrighted product, but does not give any power to
control the market for goods of the patented or copyrighted type.254
The misuse defense has also been undercut by judicial acknowledgement of the economic analysis about the types of behavior that
cause anticompetitive effects. Specifically, the single monopoly
profit theory holds that a monopolist cannot extract the same
monopoly profit twice simply by tying a product in a competitive
market to sales of a product over which the monopolist has monopoly power.255 Accordingly, a number of scholars have argued that
when firms with monopoly power in a product engage in tying, there
must be a procompetitive or efficiency reason for the tie.256 For
example, firms with market power in a product may engage in tying
for the procompetitive reason of quality assurance. If a complex
machine requires regular and delicate service, or works best with
only certain parts, a seller of the machine may desire to tie service
to the product to ensure that the machine’s reputation for reliability
is not damaged. Likewise, tying two goods together might decrease
the cost of selling or delivering, or might increase value to consum253. See id. at 44-45.
254. See RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 197-98 (2001).
255. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372-73 (1978); POSNER, supra note 254,
at 198; Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J.
19, 21-23 (1957); Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901, 939 n.169 (2007); Aaron
Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281,
290-94 (1956).
256. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 255, at 371-72; David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla,
Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 73, 81-82 (2005) (arguing that when a monopolist engages in tying, the practice
should be presumed procompetitive); Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean
World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 111, 114 (1996) (arguing that
tying is procompetitive and would be engaged in regardless of the presence of market power).
Note that the terms “procompetitive” and “efficiency” are synonymous if by each we mean
maximizing total welfare of society, including both producer and consumer welfare. But courts
deciding antitrust cases have not thus far embraced as “procompetitive” actions that increase
total welfare at the expense of consumer welfare. Thus, for example, even though a firm with
market power over a product can increase total welfare by engaging in perfect price
discrimination, the amount of consumer welfare is decreased by the firm’s price
discrimination. Although an economist would say that this is a welfare-enhancing move, an
antitrust court may not.
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ers, such as selling batteries in packages with electronics.257 In
addition, tying may allow a seller to provide financing effectively to
a purchaser of expensive equipment.258 A seller could accomplish
this by selling the equipment below cost and then charging abovecost prices for products that need to be consumed to use the
machine.259 This would allow the customer to pay the full price of
the equipment over time.260 Finally, tying can allow price discrimination, which may either increase or decrease both consumer and
total welfare.261 Perfect price discrimination would eliminate all
consumer surplus but would also eliminate all deadweight loss from
monopoly, thus giving maximum efficiency and the highest level of
total welfare to society.262 But partial price discrimination may
result in situations that are neutral or even harmful to total
welfare, depending on the elasticities of consumers and suppliers.263
257. For an overview of how tying can be efficient and welfare enhancing, see EINER
ELHAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 357-58 (2008).
258. Id. at 358.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 427 (2009).
262. See BORK, supra note 255, at 275, 295; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 231 (1985); POSNER, supra note 254, at 206-07; Daniel Clough, Law
and Economics of Vertical Restraints in Australia, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 551, 555 (2001);
Elhauge, supra note 261, at 405 n.7 (“At a uniform monopoly price, buyers who value the
product above that price enjoy consumer surplus. Perfect price discrimination transfers all
that consumer surplus to the seller ... [and in turn] increases total ex post welfare because it
eliminates all deadweight loss by producing all output that some buyer values above cost.”).
263. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2063-67 (2000) (arguing that because price discrimination is costly to implement, whether it is socially beneficial will depend on whether
enhanced consumer access to excludable works will outweigh the loss from reduction in free
access to previously nonexcluded works); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1811 (2000) (asserting that evidence from real life implies that contractual price discrimination is not as streamlined as some proponents contend); Wendy J.
Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1367, 1369 (1998) (arguing that price discrimination at best mitigates the undesirable
effects of monopolies, but that it may “raise price and reduce quantities, without yielding any
incentive payoff large enough to compensate”); Michael L. Katz, Non-Uniform Pricing, Output,
and Welfare under Monopoly, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 37, 37 (1983) (noting that a move from
uniform pricing to second-degree price discrimination creates unpredictable effects for social
welfare); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use, and Piracy: Copyright
Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 849 (1997) (expressing doubts about
whether price discrimination results in efficiency gains); Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price
Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259, 1259
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In addition, some have argued that price discrimination may allow
a patent holder to extract more return on its invention than
Congress intended.264
In addition to arguments about the efficiency of imperfect price
discrimination, scholars have made a number of critiques of the
single monopoly profit theory, and have argued that there are
situations in which a monopolist can, indeed, leverage its monopoly
in one product into excess power in another market. For instance,
tying may allow a monopolist to set prices in the tying and tied
market in such a way that a potential new entrant who can enter
only one of the markets is deterred from making the cost investment
to enter that market because the returns to investment are low.265
C. The Decline of Misuse Defenses Based on Antitrust Principles?
The critiques and countercritiques of both antitrust-based misuse
defenses and tying more generally lead one to ask: will a patent or
copyright misuse defense based on antitrust principles continue to
be viable? There is much to learn from studying the modern debate
on patent and copyright misuse and on tying, but how shall we
decide cases while the debate is ongoing? It turns out that attempting to apply modern, sophisticated economic analysis to determine
whether the conduct in “traditional” patent misuse cases is actually
anticompetitive is quite difficult, at least without substantially more
evidence.
For instance, in Morton Salt, the defendant might have made a
quality argument to justify its tying.266 In the very similar case of
(1990) (contending that, within a partial equilibrium analysis, a change from uniform pricing
to third-degree price discrimination will in some cases increase, and in others cases reduce,
welfare).
264. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1815, 1875 (1984) (“[P]rice discrimination also raises the problem of disproportionately high
rewards to patentees, which ... can make for bad patent policy independent of how such
discrimination fares under antitrust analysis.”).
265. See Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159, 160-61 (2004);
Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 840-46
(1990). For a fulsome critique of the single monopoly profit theory, see Elhauge, supra note
261.
266. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1942) (arguing instead
“that this doctrine is limited in its application”).
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International Salt v. United States, the defendant made just such an
argument.267 Recall that Morton Salt tied a requirement to buy salt
tablets to sales of its patented salt-tablet insertion equipment that
was used in industrial canning processes.268 Similarly, International
Salt leased its patented salt-injection equipment to industrial
canners contingent on the industrial canners buying their salt from
International Salt.269 When accused of anticompetitive tying, just as
Morton Salt was, International Salt sought to justify its tying
arrangement by arguing that the tie increased the longevity of its
equipment.270 Specifically, International Salt argued that competitors’ salts had lower sodium chloride content and higher percentages
of insoluble impurities, which disturbed the functioning of International Salt’s equipment and increased maintenance costs.271 Because
International Salt was obligated to repair and maintain the
machines under the leases, it argued that it was reasonable to
require equipment lessees to purchase its own high-quality salt.272
International Salt also argued that the structure of its tying
arrangement prevented it from extracting above-market prices for
salt because International Salt only had a right of first refusal to
make the salt sales.273 If a customer could find salt of equal quality
for a lower price than International Salt offered, then the customer
was obligated to notify International Salt and give it an opportunity
to match the price.274 But if International Salt did not match the
price, the agreement allowed the customer to buy from the lowerpriced salt provider.275 In the end, the Court rejected International
Salt’s defenses, holding that if International Salt was really
concerned that only high-quality salt be used in its machines, a less267. 332 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947).
268. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490-91; supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
269. Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. at 394-95. Interestingly, while Morton Salt was ruled to have
misused its patents, the patent misuse defense does not seem to have been raised in
International Salt. The Supreme Court certainly did not address it, at any rate. This shows
how duplicative an antitrust-based misuse defense can be of conventional antitrust analysis.
270. Id. at 397.
271. Id.
272. Note that International Salt’s contract requiring it to maintain its machine was also
a tie—service was tied to the lease of the patented equipment. This tie did not seem to concern
the Court, however, suggesting that the Court implicitly thought some ties could be beneficial.
273. Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. at 396-97.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 396.
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restrictive means of achieving that goal was simply to require the
use of salt above a certain grade as a condition of the lease.276
Notwithstanding the Court’s decision in International Salt, the
facts of the case cast doubt on an anticompetitive effect from the
tying at issue. First, the Court did not require any showing of
significant foreclosure in the salt market.277 Second, the Court’s
proposed less-restrictive alternative—that International Salt simply
require the use of high-grade salt as a condition of the lease—was
unlikely to assure the usage of high-quality salt so long as International Salt had the responsibility to repair and maintain the
machines.278 In such a situation, the industrial canners would have
an incentive to use lower-quality, lower-priced salt and let the costs
of extra maintenance fall on International Salt, so the tie could very
well have been the most efficient way to assure that high-quality
salt was used. Moreover, the requirement that International Salt
match the price of its lowest-price competitor for equivalent-quality
salt meant that International Salt could not price its salt above
market rates unless there was collusion in the entire salt market.
Note that it is still possible that the tying in International Salt
allowed some kind of anticompetitive behavior, such as price
leadership if the market was collusive, although that is hard to
imagine in a market for a staple product like salt. Or International
Salt may have falsely asserted that a competitor’s lower-priced salt
was of lower quality and, thus, that customers were obligated to buy
International Salt’s higher-priced salt. One would think, however,
that competitors could prove the quality of their salt fairly easily.
And even if International Salt was able to tie its salt to its equipment and charge above-market prices for the salt, it is hard to see
how International Salt would have been able to get more than a
single monopoly profit here, as there does not seem to have been any
likelihood that the tie could foreclose a significant amount of the
salt market.

276. Id. at 397-98.
277. In fact, scholarly analysis casts doubt on any market foreclosure. See John L.
Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & ECON. 351, 351 (1979) (finding that salt
sales made to supply one of International Salt’s two types of leased machines accounted for
only four percent of salt sales in the relevant geographic areas).
278. Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. at 397-98.
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Likewise, the outcome of cases regarding block booking movies,
like United States v. Loew’s, Inc.279 and United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.,280 would be uncertain in light of the modern sophisticated economic critiques and defenses of misuse defenses and tying
practices. The foreclosure effect from block booking is certainly
much greater than the foreclosure effect in the salt market in
Morton Salt. Loew’s or Paramount Pictures may have been able to
keep rivals out of certain markets by block booking, especially if
there were specific costs to getting into certain markets, although
no obvious reasons for large entry costs come to mind. But Loew’s
or Paramount may also have used block booking for efficiency or
cost-saving reasons. Furthermore, the single monopoly profit theory
may apply here as one would expect theater owners to look at the
costs of showing the block of movies from Loew’s or Paramount
Pictures as opposed to the costs of showing a variety of movies from
others. Other cases, like the M. Witmark & Sons 281 case, would not
occur these days because movie soundtracks are so integrated into
movies that they are obviously a single product, although one for
which the producer and distributor must clear many intellectual
property rights.282
Regardless of what would be the most efficient outcome in each
of the above cases, one can see that the complexity of determining
the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of copyright owners’
restrictive uses of their copyrights makes determining when and if
an antitrust-based misuse defense should apply quite difficult.
Moreover, the complexity of the determinations can be cited as a
justification for doing such analysis solely within an antitrust
context in which the complex balancing and analysis of procompetitive and anticompetitive arguments have been worked out, and
continue to be worked out, for more than a century. This debate has

279. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
280. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
281. M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948); see supra notes 175-88
and accompanying text.
282. See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRIES 744-46, 840-45 (5th ed. 2007); DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 231-33, 416-17 (6th ed. 2006); Sara K. Stadler, Performance
Values, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 697, 731 (2008).
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yet to be resolved, but the future of a misuse defense grounded in
anticompetitive behavior seems to be one of decline.
V. THE CASE FOR BASING COPYRIGHT MISUSE ON FIRST
AMENDMENT SPEECH INTERESTS
How should copyright respond at this critical juncture in the
regime’s history? Just as copyright law is embracing misuse borrowed from patent law, such antitrust-based misuse seems to be
on the decline.283 I propose that, as we evaluate copyright misuse
at this crossroads, we should not continue to base it in antitrust
principles and thus sentence it to likely decline. Instead, copyright misuse should be firmly and primarily grounded in First
Amendment speech interests. Although the debates about tying
and antitrust-based misuse can and should determine the future
of the patent misuse defense, these debates should not determine
the future of the copyright misuse defense because the First
Amendment provides a separate, and more compelling, policy basis
for copyright misuse than does antitrust. Restrictive uses of patents
and patent-tying arrangements raise economic concerns but do not
raise speech issues, because everyone remains free to study, copy,
comment on, and disseminate a patent—they just may not build the
patented invention without permission. Thus, a patent may give its
owner economic power,284 but it does not give its owner power to
control the speech of others.
The copyright grant is quite another thing. Whereas a patent
prohibits only making, using, or selling a patented invention, but
not dissemination of the patent document itself, the very purpose of
copyright law is to give the owner of the copyright the power to limit
copying and dissemination of the copyrighted document. Thus,
anyone wanting to quote from the copyrighted work, whether to
comment on the work itself or as part of another project, must either
receive permission from the copyright holder or have a valid fair use
defense to copyright infringement.285 The difficulties with exercising
283. See supra Part IV.C.
284. Or a patent may give no market power. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying
text.
285. See supra Part I.
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valid fair use rights, and the ability of copyright owners to deter
valid fair use of their works by threatening lawsuits, even if
meritless, have been discussed in detail in Part II.286 This imbalance
in power between copyright owners and would-be fair users
frustrates the balance set by Congress between copyright protection
and the socially optimal amount of unlicensed use of copyrighted
works.287 Although a number of proposals have been made to
strengthen or clarify fair use, or to make fair use determinations
less costly,288 if we are interested in simply making more practically
available the fair use rights that Congress set out as legally
available under § 107 of the Copyright Act, then allowing a claim of
copyright misuse based in First Amendment interests as a defense
to copyright infringement claims and threats could go a good
distance to effectuating these rights.
As discussed in Part II, copyright cases often raise First
Amendment speech concerns. It is quite often the case that the best
way to engage with, comment on, critique, or explain the speech of
someone else is to quote portions of that speech directly. In other
cases, using the ideas proposed by someone else may require some
use of the original expression of the ideas. When such original
expression is subject to copyright, the copyright holder’s exclusive
right to control others’ copying of his original expression can run
smack into the First Amendment speech interests of the person
seeking to quote the copyrighted work. As explored in Parts I and II,
this well-recognized conflict between copyright law and First
Amendment speech interests led to the development of two doctrines within copyright law that protect and accommodate First
Amendment speech interests with regard to copyrighted works: the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.289 Both serve
to explicitly balance the interests a copyright holder has in his
exclusive rights to his copyrighted expression against the interests
of others in making use of the copyright holder’s work in service of
First Amendment speech values.290
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra Part II.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
See supra Part III.
See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding some fair criticisms,291 the fair use analysis
codified in the copyright statute is overall a solid vehicle for
allowing courts to consider all of the factors that weigh for and
against fair use. But in the real world of copyright enforcement,
copyright owners often have the power to prevent subsequent uses
of copyrighted material that are legally allowed under the fair use
statute. As described in Part II, copyright holders can deter many
fair uses by threatening to sue for copyright infringement. Because
there is enough gray area in determining fair use,292 the cost of
defending a copyright infringement suit is high,293 and because a
copyright holder can control whether and when to sue, and when to
dismiss a suit if it starts going against him,294 the mere threat of
litigation will deter many uses of copyrighted material that are fair
as a matter of law.295 This is a misuse of the copyright power
granted by statute, but in many cases, it is not an anticompetitive
misuse designed to increase profits for the copyright holder. Rather,
the core of cases in which legal fair uses are being prevented are
those in which the copyright holder desires to squelch particular
speech about, or particular use of, his copyrighted material that he
finds personally objectionable, as was the case with the Joyce
Estate’s attempts to prevent Professor Shloss’s fair use.296
If we shift the policy basis for the copyright misuse defense from
antitrust law to First Amendment speech interests, courts can focus
on discouraging copyright misuse that chills speech. Such a shift is
warranted for two reasons. First, as the above critiques of antitrustbased misuse point out, antitrust law provides protection against
the very anticompetitive behavior that courts have used misuse to
address, perhaps with more accurate results.297 Second, the misuse
of copyright to chill speech is not protected, as a practical matter, by
another body of law. Thus, shifting the basis for the copyright
misuse defense from a focus on anticompetitive behavior to a focus
on speech-chilling behavior will provide practical protection that is
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

See supra Part III.
See supra notes 98-99, 110-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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not currently provided by any other area of law for fair use rights.
Not only is such a shift in the foundations of a copyright misuse
defense desirable, it is a solution that courts can readily implement.
It is an equitable defense developed by the courts and thus subject
to revision by the courts.298 This Article shows that the anticompetitive behavior with which courts generally have been concerned
in misuse cases can be addressed, perhaps better, through antitrust
law.299 But the speech-chilling misuse of copyrights cannot be
addressed in other areas of the law, nor does fair use give practical
protection against such speech-chilling misuse of copyrights. Thus,
in determining whether a copyright holder has behaved with clean
enough hands that its copyrights should be enforced by a court in
equity, courts are entirely right and proper in focusing on whether
copyright holders have misused their copyrights by bad-faith efforts
to deter fair uses of copyrighted materials.
A speech-focused copyright misuse defense will provide the
practical protection for fair use that is now missing by making it
potentially more costly for copyright owners to try to stop fair use.
Once a First Amendment based copyright misuse defense is widely
recognized by the courts, copyright owners suing for copyright
infringement will have to worry about whether a court might refuse
to enforce their copyrights because they have engaged in copyright
misuse with respect to either the defendant or anyone else. Recall
that in Lasercomb the court refused to enforce the plaintiff’s
copyright not only against the victims of the plaintiff’s misuse but
against anyone, even a defendant who had copied Lasercomb’s
software and marketed it as its own.300 Thus, because of this unique
characteristic of the misuse defense—that misuse against anyone
can result in an inability to enforce the copyright against everyone—a copyright misuse defense based in speech interests will
cause copyright owners to think carefully before engaging in
298. Cf. Joe Potenza et al., Patent Misuse—The Critical Balance, A Patent Lawyer’s View,
15 FED. CIR. B.J. 69, 69, 100 (2005) (“The roots of patent misuse lay in the law of patents (that
is, the doctrine of unclean hands), not the law of antitrust.... [I]n this equitable doctrine, the
law cannot stand still or else it will not continue to protect the underlying rationale of the
patent system or the ever-changing concept the patent system itself protects—innovation.”)
(footnote omitted).
299. See supra Part IV.B.1.
300. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); supra notes 189-204.
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possible misuse of their copyrights. If the price of deterring fair use
could include the inability to collect copyright royalties from anyone
for a period of time, one would expect copyright owners to be much
more reticent to engage in behavior that might constitute misuse.
A few commentators have discussed expanding the policy basis for
copyright misuse from antitrust to a broader conception of misuse
that includes prohibiting use of a copyright that violates public
policy.301 Some commentators have even suggested that violations
of First Amendment speech interests could be part of the basis for
copyright misuse,302 but no one has made the case articulated in
this Article that the copyright misuse defense must be completely
decoupled from antitrust theory and based firmly on a policy of
protecting First Amendment speech interests.
Recent reform proposals for copyright misuse include Thomas
Cotter’s suggestion that copyright and patent misuse doctrine
should be reformed so as to make the doctrine more predictable and
to better serve patent and copyright policies.303 Cotter’s approach
allows misuse to focus on both anticompetitive and other harms
from the misuse of patents and copyrights. Cotter argues that the
inquiry should be whether particular conduct broadens the scope
of the patent or copyright grant.304 Once problematic behavior is
identified, Cotter urges courts to develop a more predictable set of
criteria for determining misuse, preferably by focusing on a handful
of recurring situations, such as overbroad contractual restrictions
on reverse engineering or contractual restrictions that prohibit the
licensee from engaging in fair use.305 Cotter also urges the imposition of a standing requirement that would allow the misuse defense
to be raised only by those against whom misuse occurred.306 Finally,
the remedy for misuse would be simply that a challenged contractual provision would be unenforceable.307
Although Cotter’s suggestions have merit when it comes to adding
predictability to misuse determinations, his approach would actu301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

See infra notes 303-09 and accompanying text.
See infra note 309.
Cotter, supra note 255, at 963.
Id.
Id. at 963-64.
Id. at 960-62.
Id. at 934.
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ally lead to even less protection against copyright holders who
threaten litigation to deter fair use. Cotter’s approach would allow
contractual provisions forbidding fair use to be voided, but this
would provide little deterrence against copyright holders who would
seek to threaten or pursue litigation to deter fair use. Moreover,
Cotter’s restriction on standing to include only those against whom
misuse has occurred would allow copyright holders to be strategic
in their misuse of their copyrights because only those who have
signed contractual provisions that constitute misuse could sue. As
a result, under Cotter’s proposal, copyright holders could threaten
litigation against would-be fair users without worry of having to
defend a misuse claim so long as they do not enter into contracts
with the would-be fair users. Thus, one of the two features that
makes misuse uniquely effective as a deterrent—the ability to
defend based on a copyright holder’s misuse of his patent against
anyone—would disappear under Cotter’s system.308
Other commentators have suggested that the policy rationale
underlying copyright misuse could be broadened to include considerations of the “public policy” underlying copyright law, which may
include considering speech and fair use interests.309 But none of
308. The other feature that makes misuse uniquely effective as a deterrent is that the
result of a misuse finding is that the copyright holder cannot assert his copyright against
anyone until the misuse is cured. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual
Property Monopoly, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 40 (1998) (“[C]ourts should steer the [copyright]
misuse defense away from straight antitrust analysis.... A public policy/equity defense,
combined with the possibility of a separate antitrust suit in cases of flagrantly anticompetitive
behavior, should suffice to protect licensees and competitors while deterring clear antitrust
violations by copyright owners.”); Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 157, at 871 (proposing
“narrow public policy-based per se rules [to] supplement a core antitrust-based [misuse]
defense”); Patry & Posner, supra note 149, at 1658 (“The doctrine of copyright misuse is thus
applicable where litigation is threatened in an effort to extract a licensing fee or other profit
when there is no reasonable basis for supposing that the threatener's copyright has been
infringed.”); Note, supra note 154, at 1307-08 (urging application of full antitrust analysis in
determining competition questions via misuse, but also stating, without further exploration,
that the public policy underlying copyright law—including the First Amendment interests in
dissemination of ideas—is a suitable basis for finding copyright misuse); John Baker
McClanahan, Note, Copyright Misuse as a Defense in an Infringement Action: Lasercomb
America Inc. v. Reynolds, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 213, 234-35 (1992) (examining the
Lasercomb case and asserting, without further exploration, that “[t]he scope of this [copyright
misuse] defense, however, should not be limited either by an antitrust standard or by the
statutory development of patent misuse” and holding that “the scope of the copyright misuse
defense should extend to the point where the copyright owner has extended the copyright
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these proposals recognize the need to make First Amendment
principles the first and primary basis for the copyright misuse
defense. Failing to base the copyright misuse defense in First
Amendment principles will lead to confused decision making that
does not adequately prevent the chilling of speech that copyright
misuse is uniquely situated to deter. Having both antitrust and
“public policy” as the bases for copyright misuse invites confusion
and diverts courts’ attention away from providing practical protections for fair use rights. Nor is the solution to advise courts to
decide copyright misuse defenses by focusing only on the “public
policy” underlying copyright law. This approach again diverts focus
from the protection of First Amendment speech interests that
copyright misuse is uniquely situated to accomplish, and it also
risks confused and inconsistent decisions given the number of
competing policies at work in copyright law,310 including the policy
of granting authors rewards of exclusive rights for their works so as
to assure that they have adequate incentives to create works.311 If
beyond the grant and, therefore, has subverted public policy”). But see Aylward, supra note
247, at 691-93 (opining that copyright misuse’s policy basis is broader than antitrust but
should not be).
310. Although courts focus on the incentive purpose of copyright, they focus on and balance
it in different ways with the public’s interest in dissemination and the public domain. See, e.g.,
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that the core
purpose of copyright law “is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor” and thereby
“to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered.”); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.14.2 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2008) (discussing copyright’s “general object of encouraging the
production and dissemination of the widest possible variety of literary and artistic works
desired by consumers”); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03[A] (2009) (“[T]he authorization to grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of
copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative
activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary condition to the full
realization of such creative activities. Implicit in this rationale is the assumption that in the
absence of such public benefit, the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals would be
unjustified. This appears to be consonant with the pervading public policy against according
private economic monopolies in the absence of overriding countervailing considerations.”)
(footnotes omitted).
311. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985) (finding
the limited grant of the copyright is a means of incentivizing the creation of works for the
public to access); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
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a court focuses on this “public policy” of copyright law, it may end up
ruling that copyright misuse should not apply even in cases where
a copyright owner seeks to use its copyright to squelch important
speech that has no effect on the copyrighted work’s market value.
This would be an inferior application of the copyright misuse
defense.
What would a copyright misuse defense based firmly in First
Amendment policy look like? First, defendants to a copyright suit
could enter evidence of any attempts by the copyright holder to chill
obvious fair use through use of litigation or threats of litigation.
This ability to bring forth evidence of a copyright holder’s misuse
against anyone as a defense in any copyright infringement suit will
cause copyright holders to think carefully before being too aggressive in seeking to deter obvious fair use.
But focusing copyright misuse on First Amendment values will
sweep up more than just bad faith attempts to deter fair use. If we
take seriously the copyright holder’s obligation not to use his copyright to chill the First Amendment speech interests of others, then
we must look beyond mere wrongful threats of litigation and also
consider the licensing practices of copyright holders. There are
certain restrictions in copyright licenses that will run afoul of the
misuse defense. In considering a copyright holder’s licensing practices, courts will perform an analysis that is somewhat similar to
the analysis that courts have traditionally performed in deciding
misuse defenses, except that, instead of looking for an economic tie,
courts will look to whether a copyright holder has tied his grant of
copyright permission to unreasonable restrictions on the speech
interest of the licensee of the work.
Courts might focus on copyright misuse affecting speech interests
in licensing in a number of different ways. First, courts may wish to
explicitly define some presumptions of copyright misuse. Five types
of per se misuse might be (1) knowingly misrepresenting that one
owns copyrights that one does not, (2) contractual restrictions that
(stating that the Copyright Act “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired”); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (noting that the “reward to the author or
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius”).
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prohibit a licensee from engaging in fair use,312 (3) attempts by a
copyright holder to gain editorial or narrative control over the work
of a third party who is not an agent of the copyright holder,313
(4) attempts by a copyright holder to cut off areas of inquiry for
third parties using the holder’s copyrights, or (5) attempts by a
copyright holder to put certain subject matter out of the bounds of
inquiry of a third-party user of the copyright holder’s work. The
copyright holder might attempt to gain such control over areas of
inquiry by exchanging copyright permissions for agreements not to
write about subjects that the copyright holder does not want
discussed.
License provisions tying editorial control or subject matter
restrictions to copyright use are misuses of copyright not because
they leverage the copyright for financial gain, but because they chill
First Amendment speech of others. Similarly, any licensing requirements that forbid inquiry into certain areas, or that otherwise seek
to control the content of the licensee’s work, should presumptively
be copyright misuse. Thus, biographers should not have their right
to quote copyrighted works controlled by an author’s estate
conditioned on the estate exerting some sort of control over what the
biographer writes.314 Nor could the estate threaten to sue the
biographer for the biographer’s unlicensed fair use of copyrighted
material without having to worry that by misusing its copyrights it

312. This presumptive misuse is adopted from Cotter, supra note 255.
313. To qualify for copyright misuse based on speech interests the copyright holder must
be trying to gain control of the work of a third party who is not in an employment or agency
relationship with the copyright holder. Plainly a copyright holder must be allowed to set terms
for those who work on her behalf. An author objecting to the way her publicist describes her
book would obviously not be copyright misuse. Likewise, a movie distributor licensing others
to show trailers of its movies may reasonably restrict its licensees from making derogatory
comments about the movies because other venues for criticism of the movies exist and the
movie distributor should be able to control licensed promotion of the movie. See Video
Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d Cir. 2003).
314. This is not to say that the author’s estate should not be able to make any choices
concerning who writes about the author. An estate would be within its rights to deny any
license to a biographer well-known for being a sensationalist, or even to one who is simply a
poor writer. Such writers can then rely on fair use to make their unauthorized biographies.
It should not be copyright misuse for an estate or author to chose a biographer, rather, misuse
occurs when the estate tries to control what a biographer says via its licensing of copyrighted
works.
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was taking a risk that it would make them unenforceable against
everyone.
In addition to presumptions of misuse that focus on the actions of
the copyright holder, courts may add presumptions of misuse that
focus on the type of use that the user of the copyrighted work seeks
to make. For instance, courts could say that there is presumptive
First Amendment value to the use of copyrighted works for purposes
of scholarship, reporting, or commenting on matters of public
concern or on public figures; therefore, copyright misuse may be
presumed if a copyright holder is found to have taken actions to
negatively affect such uses. The copyright holder might rebut such
a presumption by showing that it took the actions it did for other
legitimate purposes, and not for the purpose of discouraging
scholarship, comment, or critique. To the extent that courts adopt
presumptions that certain actions by copyright holders constitute
misuse, a defendant’s entry of evidence showing that the copyright
owner engaged in conduct conforming to one of the presumptions
would be misuse unless the copyright holder showed why the
presumption should not apply in a particular case.
It is true that a clever copyright holder could still seek to control
what is investigated by those quoting from its copyrighted works by
making any quid pro quos implicit, rather than explicit. But even
considering some cheating to avoid the per se rules, the normative
power of the law telling copyright holders and fair users what is in
and out of bounds is powerful in its own way.315
Moreover, the potential for a misuse claim to be brought in future
infringement lawsuits will provide deterrence to the copyright
holder against engaging in misuse. In infringement cases in which
a court determines that a copyright owner has engaged in misuse,
no further examination of the exhaustive factors in the fair use
determination need be made. Thus, once the copyright holder has
been found to have misused its copyrights, a fair user need no longer
worry that some of her use of the copyright holder’s work may be
found to fall on the infringing side of fair use.
While this Article sets forth the First Amendment speech-based
rationale for the defense of copyright misuse, it should not be
315. Neil MacCormick, Institutional Normative Order: A Conception of Law, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 1051, 1063 (1997).
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interpreted as an argument that the defense of copyright misuse
should only apply if a court’s enforcement of a copyright would
violate a defendant’s First Amendment speech interests in using the
copyrighted work. Rather, courts should use the equitable defense
of copyright misuse to help give practical protection to the speech
interests of subsequent users of copyrighted works without having
to make a formal First Amendment inquiry. Courts should model
their application of copyright misuse after their application of fair
use. There courts created the defense of fair use as a way to protect
the First Amendment interests of subsequent users of copyrighted
works.316 Courts deciding fair use cases did not engage in discussions of whether to enforce a copyright in a particular instance
would violate a subsequent speaker’s First Amendment rights.
Rather, courts devised a test for fair use that seeks to balance the
interests of copyright owners and later speakers.317 Courts have
been explicit in saying that fair use exists to serve speech interests,
but have developed a body of fair use law that is neither coterminous with, nor strictly limited to, the First Amendment speech
rights of subsequent users of copyrights.318 Likewise, courts should
apply the equitable defense of copyright misuse to form a buffer of
protection around speech interests so that First Amendment
violations do not occur in the enforcement of copyrights. Thus it is
reasonable for courts to call certain acts misuse even if they may not
rise to the level of First Amendment violations.
An objection to speech-based copyright misuse might be that a
strong speech-based copyright misuse defense will strip copyright
holders of the ability to protect their copyrighted works if they
mistakenly get the fair use determination wrong when engaged in
licensing and enforcement of their copyrights. This objection is
easily dealt with, because misuse cannot be found simply because
a court determines that a copyright holder was wrong about his
good-faith belief that certain uses of his copyrighted works were
infringing. It would be plainly counterproductive to make copyright
316. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
317. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-69 (1985).
318. While the right of fair use is now part of the Copyright Statute, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006),
courts first developed it as an equitable defense based on, but not strictly limited to, First
Amendment interests of subsequent users of copyrighted works. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
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misuse a strict liability punishment for getting the famously
difficult determination of fair use wrong.319 Rather, before ruling
that a copyright holder has misused his copyright, a court should determine that the copyright holder’s conduct went well above and
beyond the conduct of a copyright owner engaged in good-faith
negotiation or litigation regarding his copyrights. Some examples of
egregious conduct that should qualify as misuse are (1) that a
copyright holder engaged in the conduct set out above that qualifies
as presumptive misuse;320 (2) that a copyright holder threatened or
pursued litigation without a good-faith infringement argument; or
(3) that a copyright holder knowingly misrepresented his rights
under copyright law to control the subsequent user’s speech.321
If a court determines that a copyright holder has lost the ability
to enforce its copyright due to misuse, it will need to determine what
conditions must be met by the copyright holder and how much time
will have to pass before the copyright holder can enforce its
copyright. The general rule for misuse is that a misuser cannot
enforce its patent or copyright until it has cured its own misuse.322
To cure a misuse, a copyright holder may be required to release licensees from any terms or restrictions that constitute misuse, such
as exchanging permission to quote copyrighted works for promises
as to how the would-be fair user would characterize the information.323 In cases of prolonged misuse, however, like that engaged
in by the Joyce Estate,324 a court should hold that it takes some time
to cure the speech-chilling effects of prolonged copyright misuse
aimed at cutting off inquiry that the copyright holder wanted to
keep secret. Thus, in cases where misuse continued for years, it
seems perfectly sensible to bar recovery under the copyright owner’s
319. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
321. Patry & Posner, supra note 149, at 1645 (“The courts must be careful not to place
copyright owners on a razor's edge, however, where a mistake in a copyright warning
precludes enforcement of the copyright (at least until the warning is withdrawn), leading
them out of an abundance of caution to underenforce their legitimate rights. But where the
warning grossly and intentionally exaggerates the copyright holder's substantive or remedial
rights, to the prejudice of publishers of public-domain works, the case for invoking the
doctrine of copyright misuse seems to us compelling.”).
322. See supra notes 159, 165 and accompanying text.
323. Cf. supra note 312 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part I.
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copyrights for a period of years long enough to allow the misuse to
be cured. For example, if scholars have avoided making fair use of
Joyce’s work for over a decade due to the Joyce Estate’s blustering
misuse of its copyrights, then disallowing enforcement of the
Estate’s copyrights for a period of years may be appropriate.
Obviously the more the Estate did to ameliorate the situation, the
better its chances would be in returning to court and requesting that
the court rule the misuse cured sooner rather than later.
How would the Shloss case have come out under a copyright
misuse defense based in First Amendment, rather than antitrust,
principles? Some of the time and expense of litigation could have
been saved if she had been able to rely on presumptions of fair use.
The presumption that taking editorial control of a work is misuse
would have allowed Shloss simply to present the example of how the
Joyce Estate granted permission to Brenda Maddox to quote from
Joyce’s work on the condition that she not discuss Joyce’s daughter,
Lucia. Had Shloss showed the other examples of the Joyce Estate’s
misuse of its copyrights, a court might have ruled that the Estate
could not enforce its copyrights for a set number of years, perhaps
five or ten years. Of course, the remedies cannot become too severe,
or they will be unfair to the copyright holder.
It is true that First Amendment based misuse cannot deter all
misuses of copyright to chill speech. Copyright holders can always
dismiss a lawsuit that is going poorly by signing a covenant not to
sue the would-be fair user of the copyright holder’s material. Thus,
a copyright holder will still be able to threaten suit, but avoid a
finding of copyright misuse by covenanting not to sue the fair user.
But if a copyright holder wants to pursue a claim through to the
merits so as to get a copyright infringement judgment, it will have
to take the risk of a finding of copyright misuse.
This risk will make copyright suits more like patent suits. In
patent suits, the patent owner must be cautious about filing suit, or
even threatening suit, because the defendant can counterclaim that
the patent is invalid.325 If a patent owner merely threatens to sue,
the alleged infringer can file a declaratory judgment action seeking
to have the patent judged not infringed and invalid. The only way
325. See supra notes 160-66 and accompanying text (showing how Morton Salt’s patent was
de facto invalidated).
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for the patent owner to avoid the risk of having its patent ruled
invalid, assuming that prior art to do so can be found, is to file a
covenant not to sue the alleged infringer.326 Although such a
covenant preserves the validity of the patent, too many covenants
like this leave a patent with little value. The same would be true for
copyright owners. If a copyright owner makes bad-faith threats to
sue and then backs off when challenged by filing a covenant not to
sue, it avoids a finding of misuse, but it has privileged the alleged
infringer’s use and has engaged in activity that can be relied on to
make a misuse argument in every future case seeking to enforce its
copyrights. Thus, we can expect that even though a copyright owner
retains a great deal of control and can still make a number of
threats without much immediate cost to itself, its behavior should
be moderated by the knowledge that, if challenged, its copyright will
be at risk if it has engaged in behavior that might be found to be
misuse.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the First Amendment interests in fair
use and in creating new work free from the editorial control of
copyright holders is inadequately protected by the current copyright
regime. Under the current regime, copyright holders can chill
important First Amendment speech by threatening copyright
litigation in bad faith and with no consequence to themselves.
Copyright holders can also control the speech of others by only
licensing the rights to use their copyrighted materials on the
condition that the copyright holders have editorial control of the
new work. A number of meritorious legislative solutions have been
proposed to help remedy this situation, but none have been
implemented, nor are any likely to be implemented given the
political clout of corporate copyright holders. But a solution exists
to this problem that courts can implement on their own. The
equitable defense of copyright misuse is at a crossroads, as it has
gained acceptance by courts even though the antitrust basis for the
defense has been seriously undercut by critics. Courts can take this
326. Cf. supra note 118 and accompanying text (covenant not to sue in copyright).
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opportunity to shift the policy basis for the misuse defense to First
Amendment principles so that the defense can be used to deter
copyright holders engaged in misuse of their copyrights to chill or
control the speech of others. Only copyright misuse has the unique
features that make it strong enough to adequately deter abusive
copyright holders bent on chilling speech: (1) a copyright holder’s
misuse against anyone can be raised as a defense in every copyright
infringement case, and (2) a finding of misuse makes a copyright
holder’s copyrights unenforceable until the misuse is cured. Thus,
by shifting the policy basis of copyright misuse so that it is planted
firmly in First Amendment principles, courts can make the legal
rights to fair use and free speech actually available to the many
people who are currently denied the full extent of these rights by the
practical realities of the current copyright regime.

